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I.   THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT—WHICH ONE IS THAT, AGAIN? 
 The history of voting rights in the United States has primarily 
centered on the struggle to enfranchise African-Americans1—first 
after the Civil War, then in the Jim Crow South, and even today in 
the midst of “the Voting Wars.”2 Accordingly, most voting rights 
legislation, litigation, and literature have focused on race-based 
barriers to the ballot and on using Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment-based tools to break those barriers.3 This race-centered 
focus neglects a substantial population that may face its own barriers 
to the ballot: women. 
 This neglect is particularly curious, given that an entire 
constitutional amendment deals exclusively with protecting “[t]he 
right of citizens of the United States to vote [from] deni[al] or 
abridg[ment] . . . on account of sex.”4 Yet, no legislation and barely 
any litigation have arisen as a result of the Nineteenth Amendment.5 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See, e.g., GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA DEMOCRACY (2013); see also 111 CONG. REC. 5058-61 (1965) 
(statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson) (urging Congress to pass the Voting Rights 
Act); id. at 5061-63 (same). 
 2. See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE 
NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012); ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN 
STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2015). 
 3. For an example of voting rights legislation, see Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 
No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (Supp. II 2014)). 
For an example of voting rights litigation, see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
For an example of voting rights literature, see Selwyn Carter, African-American Voting 
Rights: An Historical Struggle, 44 EMORY L.J. 859 (1995). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 5. For two examples of Nineteenth Amendment litigation, see Breedlove v. Suttles, 
302 U.S. 277 (1937), and Ball v. Brown, 450 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Ohio 1977). If there were 
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation, it would be codified in subtitle I of title 52 
of the United States Code, which concerns “Voting Rights.” See 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10702 
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One legal encyclopedia spends a mere sixty-nine words on the 
Nineteenth Amendment.6 On the rare occasion that scholarly 
literature discusses the Nineteenth Amendment in depth, authors 
seem preoccupied with the provision’s impact on areas other than 
voting.7 The Nineteenth Amendment receives so little attention, 
scholars joke about it.8 The prevailing understanding of the 
Nineteenth Amendment is that it merely requires that women be 
permitted to vote9—no more, no less—and is therefore not an 
appropriate subject for scholarly attention. 
 This inattention from legislators, litigators, and legal scholars is 
all the more curious today, when voting rights enjoy mainstream 
attention not seen since the Civil Rights Movement.10 In the past few 
years, a nationwide wave of new state laws and procedures has 
burdened the right to vote. Today, women face a variety of obstacles 
to voting that may disproportionately impact voters on the basis of sex.  
 Despite the Nineteenth Amendment’s existence for nearly a 
century and the recent popular and scholarly attention to voting 
                                                                                                                  
(Supp. II 2014). Subtitle I contains no legislation concerning discrimination in voting on 
account of sex. 
 6. See 46 AM. JUR. 2d Elections § 151 (2016). 
 7. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 465, 472 (1995) (noting women’s right to serve on juries); Jennifer K. Brown, The 
Nineteenth Amendment and Women’s Equality, 102 YALE L.J. 2175, 2175 (1993) 
(recognizing the Nineteenth Amendment as “an affirmation of women’s constitutional 
equality”). Scholars have argued that the Nineteenth Amendment impacts sex 
classifications more generally, see Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and 
Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 66-96 (2011), that it guarantees women the right to 
serve on juries, see Amar, supra, that it provides a constitutional justification for Congress 
to pass the Violence Against Women Act, Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth 
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1022-44 
(2002); Sarah B. Lawsky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against 
Women Act, 109 YALE L.J. 783 (2000), that it “should be recognized as an affirmation of 
women’s constitutional equality,” Brown, supra, or that it “established the total equality of 
women with men,” W. William Hodes, Women and the Constitution: Some Legal History 
and a New Approach to the Nineteenth Amendment, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 26, 50 (1970). One 
scholar even curiously claimed that “the 19th amendment [sic] really had very little to do 
with the vote.” Hodes, supra. 
 8. See Erik M. Jensen, 16th Century 19th Amendment Jurisprudence, 4 GREEN BAG 
2d 465, 465 (2001). The article, in its entirety, reads, “Consistent with my research on 
another previously unstudied area of the law, I have determined that there were no cases 
construing the Nineteenth Amendment in the sixteenth century.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 9. See, e.g., JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage 
for the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 191 (1994) (“With the passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, women’s right to vote became part of the constitutional 
framework . . . .”). 
 10. See, e.g., Melissa Block, ID Laws Bring New Attention to Voting Rights Act, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 10, 2012, 3:00PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/10/160899032/id-laws-
bring-new-attention-to-voting-rights-act. Leading voting rights litigator Jon Greenbaum of 
the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law once used similar terms to describe the 
increased nationwide interest in voting rights in a conversation with me about recent 
election litigation. 
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rights, the Nineteenth Amendment has not received any serious 
treatment or consideration as a tool to protect voting rights. This 
Article fills that gap by offering a discussion of the history and 
purpose of the Nineteenth Amendment, and its application to 
modern-day voting restrictions. 
 Part II will examine the need for Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation by exploring modern restrictions on voting 
that may affect voters disproportionately on the basis of sex. Part III 
will explore the background against which the Nineteenth 
Amendment was proposed and ratified. Part IV will explore the legal 
and legislative history of the Nineteenth Amendment in a novel 
way—with an eye toward the provision’s application to voting 
rights—in an attempt to discern what the framers of the Amendment 
would expect it to mean today. Part V considers the constitutionality 
of possible enforcement legislation and demonstrates how Nineteenth 
Amendment litigation to defend voting rights could remedy the 
restrictions on voting mentioned earlier. Part VI will conclude with a 
recommendation for action under the Nineteenth Amendment and 
explain the practical benefits and disadvantages of using the 
Nineteenth Amendment to protect voting rights. 
II.   VOTING RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK: THE NEED FOR NINETEENTH 
AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 
 In recent years, states across the country have engaged in an 
extraordinary effort to make it harder to register to vote, to cast a 
ballot, and to have that vote counted.11 Between 2010 and mid-2015, 
twenty-one states imposed over thirty separate restrictions on the 
franchise.12 Much of the attention in the media has focused on the 
disproportionate effect of these laws on racial minority voters, 
student voters, elderly voters, lower-income voters, and 
Democratic-leaning voters.13 Scholarship has maintained a similar 
                                                                                                                  
 11. See, e.g., Ari Berman, The GOP War on Voting, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-gop-war-on-voting-20110830; Alexander 
Keyssar, Voter Suppression Returns: Voting Rights and Partisan Practices, HARV. MAG., 
July-Aug. 2012, http://harvardmagazine.com/2012/07/voter-suppression-returns. 
 12. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STATES WITH NEW VOTING RESTRICTIONS SINCE 
2010 ELECTION 1-4 (2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/ 
Restrictive_Appendix_Post-2010.pdf.  
 13. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Republicans Admit Voter-ID Laws Are Aimed at 
Democratic Voters, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
articles/2013/08/28/republicans-admit-voter-id-laws-are-aimed-at-democratic-voters.html 
(Democrats); Andrew Cohen, How Voter ID Laws Are Being Used to Disenfranchise 
Minorities and the Poor, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2012/03/how-voter-id-laws-are-being-used-to-disenfranchise-minorities-and-the-poor/ 
254572/ (low-income voters); Terry Evans & Anna M. Tinsley, Voter ID Law Snags 
Former House Speaker Jim Wright, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Nov. 2, 2013), 
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/news/politics-government/article29311579.html (elderly 
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focus.14 Until recently,15 however, the extent to which these 
restrictions on voting may disproportionately affect women had gone 
largely unnoticed. 
A.   Voter ID Laws 
 Voter ID laws are one such type of voting restriction that may 
disproportionately impact women. Generally, and with limited 
exceptions,16 voter ID laws bar any voter from casting a ballot unless 
the voter provides the precinct official with documentary proof of the 
voter’s identity.17 For a voter whose name appears differently on his 
or her voter registration record and identifying document, this 
discrepancy could present additional burdens—as in Texas, where 
                                                                                                                  
voters); Brentin Mock, Florida to Minorities: Don’t Vote Here, NATION (June 27, 2012), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/168619/florida-minorities-dont-vote-here (racial minorities); 
Max J. Rosenthal, Texans Allowed to Show Gun Permits But Not Student IDs at Voting 
Booth, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2011, 10:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/11/15/texans-gun-permits-student-ids-voting_n_1095530.html (students). 
 14. See, e.g., Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Souls to the Polls: Early Voting in 
Florida in the Shadow of House Bill 1355, 11 ELECTION L.J. 331 (2012); Spencer Overton, 
Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631 (2007); Kathleen M. Stoughton, Note, A New 
Approach to Voter ID Challenges: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
292 (2013). 
 15. A local Texas television outlet reported that poll workers temporarily blocked a 
Texas state court judge from voting—on the grounds that her maiden name listed on her 
driver’s license did not match her full name as listed in the voter registration records—
until she signed an affidavit affirming her identity. See Voter ID Law May Cause Problems 
for Women Using Maiden Names, KIII-TV (Oct. 22, 2013, 7:02 PM), http://www.kiiitv.com/ 
story/23761660/voter-id-law-may-cause-problems-for-women-using-maiden-names. Following 
that story, a surge of national media attention focused on the effect that voter ID laws may 
have on women. See, e.g., Wade Goodwyn, Texas’ Voter ID Law Creates a Problem for Some 
Women, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 30, 2013, 4:40 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/10/ 
30/241891800/texas-voter-id-law-creates-a-problem-for-some-women; Martha T. Moore, 
State Voter ID Laws Snare Women with Name Changes, USA TODAY (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:05 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/30/voter-id-laws-name-changes/ 
3315971. My research has not revealed any corresponding increase in scholarship, 
legislation, or litigation.  
 16. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-563(3)(b) (2015) (religious objection); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 7-13-710(D)(1)(b) (2015) (“a reasonable impediment”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-112(f) 
(2015) (indigency); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 65.054(b)(2)(C) (West 2015) (natural disaster); 
WIS. STAT. § 6.79(6) (2015) (victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking). Some 
voter ID laws contain no exceptions, imposing an absolute bar to voting on a voter who 
does not produce the required identification. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417(b) (2015) 
(providing that “if an elector is unable to produce any of the [approved] items of 
identification” at the polls, then the voter’s ballot will not count unless the voter presents 
valid ID to election officials within three days after the election, pursuant to section  
21-2-419). 
 17. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.043(a) (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-112(a)(1) (2015). 
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the voter must complete additional paperwork18—or even prevent the 
voter from casting a ballot altogether.19 Voters lacking any 
appropriate form of ID may likewise be unable to cast a ballot.20 
 Even in jurisdictions that bar a voter from casting a ballot due to 
a non-match or lack of an approved ID, the voter retains the ability to 
cast a provisional ballot—a ballot separated from the normal ballots 
and counted later only if the election authority can determine that 
the provisional voter is, in fact, eligible to vote.21 However, there is 
anecdotal evidence that poll workers improperly turn away voters 
with questionable voting eligibility, rather than offering them the 
opportunity to vote by provisional ballot, as required.22 Even for 
voters who are able to vote by provisional ballot, they generally must 
still obtain the required identifying document and provide it to the 
election authority within a set time period.23 
 No serious student of election law disputes that at-the-polls voter-
impersonation fraud—the type of misconduct that voter ID laws 
target—is a pernicious problem when it occurs; the relevant question 
                                                                                                                  
 18. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 63.001(c) (West 2012). This is the provision that sparked 
national media attention over the impact on women of voting restrictions. See, e.g., 
Goodwyn, supra note 15; Moore, supra note 15. 
 19. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 6.79(3)(b) (2015) (“[I]f the name appearing on the 
[identification] document presented [by the voter] does not conform to the name on the poll 
list . . . the elector shall not be permitted to vote . . . .”). Not every jurisdiction has statutory 
or regulatory guidance on how to treat discrepancies between the name on the voter’s 
identifying documents and the voter’s registration record, forcing election administrators to 
make their own decision about how to handle name discrepancies. For instance, despite the 
text of the Wisconsin statute cited above, Wisconsin’s voter ID brochure states (without 
citing any legal authority) that minor discrepancies between the first name listed on a 
voter’s ID and the first name listed in the voter’s registration record will not bar the voter 
from casting a ballot. See Brochure, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., Bring It to the Ballot 
(Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/137/_2015_brochure_ 
for_bring_it_website_color_pdf_54021.pdf (“So, Richards who go by Rich and Susans with 
IDs that say Sue can relax.”). The ad hoc nature of these decisions by state and local 
election administrators across the country makes it difficult to assess the procedures in 
this area. 
 20. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-05-07(1) (2015) (“Before delivering a ballot to a 
[voter], the poll clerks shall require the [voter] to show [an approved type of] 
identification . . . .”). 
 21. See 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a) (Supp. II 2014). 
 22. See ELECTORAL DYSFUNCTION at 38:00 (Trio Pictures 2012). The film shows a 
training session in which poll workers role-play an example of how to politely handle a 
voter who comes to vote without possessing the required identification or who is not on the 
voter rolls for that location. Id. The portions of the training shown in the film make no 
mention of offering the voter a provisional ballot. Id. 
 In my experience as an election administrator, poll worker recruitment and training 
were among the most vexing challenges an election administration office faced. 
 23. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3-11.7-5-2.5(a)-(b) (2015). Less onerous provisional ballot 
requirements also exist. For instance, Rhode Island’s voter ID law requires election 
officials to count a provisional ballot so long as the signature accompanying the provisional 
ballot matches the signature in the voter’s registration record. See 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-
19-24.3 (2015). 
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is whether the minimal risk posed by at-the-polls voter-
impersonation fraud justifies the burden imposed by these laws.24 
Women voters may be more likely to encounter these burdens than 
men, considering that the vast majority of women change their name 
following marriage, while only a small minority of men do the same.25 
While the data are so far insufficient to draw broad conclusions,26 the 
early evidence suggests this may be the case: the plaintiffs’ expert 
witness in the litigation over Pennsylvania’s voter ID law27 concluded 
that “[a]mong eligible [Pennsylvania] voters, women are less likely to 
possess a valid, non-expired photo ID with [their] name substantially 
conforming than their male counterparts,” in part because of the 
“higher likelihood of women lacking an ID with an exact name match 
to the voter rolls due to marriage.”28 An empirical study of Indiana’s 
voter ID law concluded that “some disfranchisement occurs and, to 
the extent that disfranchisement occurs, this research suggests that 
women are disproportionately disfranchised.”29 
 Data also suggests that transgender voters are especially likely to 
lack the required documentation: in a national survey of transgender 
individuals, 40% reported lacking a driver’s license reflecting their 
current gender, 74% reported lacking an updated passport, and 27% 
reported “that they had no identity documents or records that list 
their correct gender.”30 A voter whose outward appearance suggests 
                                                                                                                  
 24. See Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 
Credible Incidents Out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 6, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-of-
voter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast. 
 25. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the 
Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 785-89 (2007). For heterosexual couples, 
Professor Emens reports that “[t]he vast majority of women who marry men change their 
names to Mrs. His Name, while very few men change their names at all when they marry,” 
and that “only 10 percent of married women in the U.S. have as their last name their own 
birthname or any name other than their husband’s birthname.” Id. at 785. For gay and 
lesbian couples, Professor Emens explains that the limited data available show that “[six] 
percent share some or all of their last names, suggesting that one or both partners changed 
his or her name,” and that lesbian couples (seven percent) are more likely to share names 
than gay couples (four percent). Id. at 789. 
 26. See E-mail from Justin Levitt, Assoc. Professor of Law, Loyola Univ. Sch. of Law, 
to author (Aug. 28, 2013, 9:29 PM) (on file with author). 
 27. See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012); 25 PENN. CONS. 
STAT. § 3050 (2013), invalidated by Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.2012, 2014 
WL 184988, at *24 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014). 
 28. MATT A. BARRETO ET AL., RATES OF POSSESSION OF VALID PHOTO IDENTIFICATION, 
AND PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE VOTER ID LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA, NO. 330 MD 2012, at 27 
(2012).  
 29.  Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Measuring the Impact of Photo ID over Time and Its 
Impact on Women, 48 IND. L. REV. 605, 623 (2015). 
 30. JODY L. HERMAN, WILLIAMS INST. AT THE UCLA SCH. OF LAW, THE POTENTIAL 
IMPACT OF VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS ON TRANSGENDER VOTERS 4 (2012) (emphasis 
added), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/transgender-issues/the-potential-impact-
of-voter-identification-laws-on-transgender-voters. 
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that the voter is of a different sex than that shown on the voter’s ID 
may face problems under a broad voter ID law that, for instance, 
requires polling place officials to be able to verify a voter’s identity 
from the ID the voter provides.31 
 Even where a voter already possesses an acceptable ID under his 
or her prior name, the burdens of obtaining an updated ID may cause 
the voter difficulty, especially when the legal requirements for 
obtaining the documents are so burdensome as to make it 
extraordinarily difficult for some people (and impossible for others) to 
qualify for the IDs, when the government offices which distribute the 
IDs are so far away as to require a 200- to 250-mile round-trip, when 
the law is improperly administered by a front-line civil servant, or 
when the government limits the days on which the ID-issuing offices 
are open.32 
 The burden of obtaining additional or corrected documentation is 
likely to affect women in three ways.33 First, because women assume 
a disproportionate share of the household work and childcare 
burdens,34 these distance and complexity concerns may be more 
                                                                                                                  
 31.  See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 63.001(d) (West 2015); see also Andy Marso, 
Transgender Kansans Fear Voter ID Law Is Roadblock, TOPEKA CAP.-J. (July 20, 2014, 3:44 
PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2014-07-20/transgender-kansans-fear-voter-id-law-roadblock. 
 32. See, e.g., Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 139-41 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge 
court) (explaining that in some cases, the nearest government office providing acceptable 
identifying documents could be 100–125 miles away, necessitating a 200–250 mile round 
trip, and that public transportation was essentially unavailable), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 
(2013); Applewhite, 54 A.3d at 3-4 (explaining that the process for obtaining a voting ID “is 
a rigorous one” which requires applicants to submit four different types of documents, and 
quoting testimony from the government official responsible for distributing the IDs, “at the 
end of the day there will be people who will not be able to qualify for” the voting ID); 
Ansley Haman, 96-Year-Old Chattanooga Resident Denied Voting ID, CHATTANOOGA TIMES 
FREE PRESS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011/oct/05/marriage-
certificate-required-bureaucrat-tells; Brian Lyman, Alabama Will Reopen Closed DMV 
Offices in Black Counties, GOVERNING (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.governing.com/ 
topics/politics/drivers-license-offices-will-reopen-on-limited-basis.html.  
 33.  There is some dispute about the number of voters actually affected by voter ID 
laws. Compare DON PALMER, HERITAGE FOUND., BACKGROUNDER NO. 3069, FAULTY DATA 
FUEL CHALLENGES TO VOTER ID LAWS 9 (2016), http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
reports/2016/01/faulty-data-fuel-challenges-to-voter-id-laws (arguing that voter ID laws 
affect only a small percentage of voters), with Jennifer L. Clark, Separating Fact from 
Fiction on Voter ID Statistics, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/separating-fact-fiction-voter-id-statistics (arguing that 
voter ID laws affect a much larger segment of the electorate). The key here is the degree to 
which women are disproportionately affected, not the absolute number of voters affected. 
 34. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 
181-82 (2000) (“Upon marriage or cohabitation, the average woman increases her 
household work by 4.2 hours, while the average man decreases his household work by 3.6 
hours. Studies of the amount of time that men and women spend in parenting consistently 
show that women perform more childcare than men, although the data are somewhat 
conflicting on just how large the differential actually is.”) (footnote omitted); Andrew B. 
Coan, Is There A Constitutional Right to Select the Genes of One’s Offspring?, 63 HASTINGS 
L.J. 233, 258 (2011) (“[W]omen as a group shoulder a grossly disproportionate share of 
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onerous for women than men. Second, as previously discussed, 
because married women change their name more frequently than 
married men,35 women may have to face the burden of obtaining 
additional or corrected documentation more often. Finally, problems 
of economic inequality are particularly likely to plague women.36 
Across all occupations, women earn only 81.2% of what men earn 
(and in some white-collar professions, less than two-thirds).37 A full-
time working woman earns only 77 cents for every dollar her male 
counterpart earns, resulting in $11,084 less in median earnings every 
year.38 Women (16.3%) are also more likely than men (13.6%) to live 
in poverty.39 As the three-judge preclearance court recognized in the 
context of reviewing Texas’s voter ID law, “[s]ignificantly, these 
burdens [imposed by the voter ID law] will fall most heavily on the 
poor,”40 which means the monetary burden of obtaining qualifying 
documents may disproportionately impact women.41 
 Additionally, the burdens of obtaining corrected identifying 
documents may fall particularly hard on transgender voters.42 Texas, 
for instance “enacted a voter ID law that . . . is the most stringent in 
the country.”43 There, transgender voters seeking to update the sex 
listed on their driver license must obtain a court order reflecting the 
                                                                                                                  
child-care responsibilities . . . .”); Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring 
Masculinities, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1047, 1053-54 (2012) (“[S]eventy-one percent of 
mothers provided care on a daily basis as compared to fifty-four percent of fathers, but 
mothers provided nearly three times the care of fathers, measured by time. Men spend less 
time in sole charge of children, of the time that they do provide care. Even when both 
parents are employed full time, mothers do twice the amount of housework.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 35. See Emens, supra note 25, at 785. 
 36. See Jill C. Engle, Promoting the General Welfare: Legal Reform to Lift Women and 
Children in the United States Out of Poverty, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 5-9 (2013) 
(surveying the available data on the degree of economic inequality between the women and 
men). 
 37. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., BLS SPOTLIGHT ON STATISTICS: WOMEN 
AT WORK 7 (2011), http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2011/women/pdf/women_bls_spotlight.pdf.  
 38. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., FACT SHEET: THE WAGE GAP IS STAGNANT IN LAST DECADE 
1 (2012), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/poverty_day_wage_gap_sheet.pdf. 
 39. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NO. P60-245, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 16 (2013), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf. 
 40. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 140 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 
(2013) (mem.) (vacating decision in light of later-decided Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. 
Ct. 2612 (2013)).  
 41. Cf. id. at 140-41 (finding that “[i]n Texas, however, the poor are disproportionately 
racial minorities,” and that therefore “it is virtually certain that these burdens will 
disproportionately affect racial minorities”). 
 42. See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 759-75 (2008) 
(documenting the barriers transgender individuals face to obtaining official recognition of 
their sex transition). 
 43. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 144. 
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voter’s transition.44 As if the burden of obtaining a court order was 
insufficient, Texas courts have created barriers to judicial recognition 
of sex changes.45 
 Litigation challenging these laws has had limited success. 
Lawsuits under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act have been hit-or-
miss.46 Lawsuits under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act had some 
success until the Supreme Court gutted the provision.47 Suits 
bringing constitutional claims have not fared well.48 State court 
lawsuits have had mixed results.49 
B.   Documentary-Proof-of-Citizenship Requirements 
 Documentary-proof-of-citizenship laws may also disproportionately 
impact women. Enacted in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, and 
                                                                                                                  
 44. See 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 15.24(2)(C) (2015) (requiring an “original or certified 
copy of court order with name and date of birth (DOB) indicating an official change  
of . . . gender”). If the voter has already managed to document his or her transition on 
certain federal documents, like a passport, military identification, or naturalization 
certificate, the voter need not obtain the court order. See id. § 15.24(1). 
 45. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual woman was nonetheless still a male as a matter of 
law, notwithstanding an earlier judicial order amending her birth certificate to reflect her 
post-transition sex). 
 46. See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 237 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction against North Carolina’s voter ID law 
but noting that “[p]laintiffs may well succeed with their challenge to the [voter] 
identification law at trial”). Compare Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 519-20 (5th Cir. 
2015) (“[W]e conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining that [Texas’ 
voter ID law] has a discriminatory effect on minorities’ voting rights in violation of Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act.”), reh’g en banc granted, 815 F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 2016) (mem.), 
with Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 755 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[O]ur conclusion [is] that 
[Wisconsin’s voter ID law] does not violate § 2 [of the Voting Rights Act] . . . .”), and 
Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 407 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a Voting Rights Act § 2 
claim against Arizona’s voter ID law), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Arizona v. Inter-
tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013).  
 47. Compare Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (blocking Texas’ voter ID law), 
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013), with South Carolina v. Holder, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 
2012) (declining to block South Carolina’s voter ID law). 
 48. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008). 
 49. Compare Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844, 852-53 (holding that Arkansas’ voter 
ID law is an additional qualification imposed on voters in violation of the Arkansas 
Constitution), and Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam) 
(temporarily blocking Pennsylvania’s voter ID law on state constitutional grounds), with 
Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262, 280-81 (Wis. 2014) (finding that 
Wisconsin’s voter ID law does not violate the Wisconsin Constitution), and League of 
Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 302, 315-16 (Wis. 2014) 
(upholding that state’s voter ID law), and City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 111 
(Tenn. 2013) (“[W]e find no basis for invalidating [Tennessee’s voter ID law] on [Tennessee] 
constitutional grounds.”), and Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 71-75 
(Ga. 2011) (finding that Georgia’s voter ID law does not violate the Georgia Constitution), 
and League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 772 (Ind. 2010) 
(finding that Indiana’s voter ID law does not violate the Indiana Constitution). 
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Tennessee, these laws bar voter registration applicants from 
registering unless the applicant proves, with adequate 
documentation, his or her U.S. citizenship.50 Although the Supreme 
Court blocked Arizona from enforcing its proof-of-citizenship 
requirement against certain voters, Kansas and Arizona both took 
advantage of a federalism loophole in the Court’s decision and began 
to implement a two-tier system of voter registration:51 applicants who 
comply with the documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirement may 
vote in all elections, but applicants who merely swear to their 
citizenship under penalty of perjury, without providing any 
supporting documentation, may vote only in federal elections.52 After 
a state court lawsuit blocked Kansas’ two-tier voter registration 
program,53 the executive director of the Election Assistance 
Commission (without action by the Commission itself) authorized the 
                                                                                                                  
 50. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-28(c) (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-166(F) (2015), 
partially preempted, Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-216(g)(1) (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2309(l) (2015); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 2-2-141 (2015). Generally, other states permit an applicant to prove his or her 
citizenship by affirmation under penalty of perjury on the application form, without 
requiring any additional documentation. See, e.g., Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 
at 2252 (“[T]he Federal Form [a nationally applicable voter registration application form 
that all fifty states ‘shall accept and use,’ 52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1) (Supp. II 2014)] includes 
a statutorily required attestation, subscribed to under penalty of perjury, that  
an . . . applicant meets the State’s voting requirements (including the citizenship 
requirement), but does not require concrete evidence of citizenship.”) (citation omitted).  
 51. See Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. at 2260 (“We hold that 42 
U.S.C. § 1973gg–4 precludes Arizona from requiring a Federal Form applicant to submit 
information beyond that required by the form itself.”). The Supreme Court based its 
decision on Congress’s power under the Elections Clause to regulate federal elections. See 
id. at 2253-54; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The “loophole” is that, because 
Congress’s Elections Clause power extends only to federal elections, Congress cannot force 
Arizona or Kansas to “accept and use,” 52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1), the Federal Form in a voter 
registration system that applies only to non-federal elections. 
In addition, Arizona and Kansas jointly filed a lawsuit bringing administrative law 
claims to achieve what their constitutional claims failed to accomplish before the Supreme 
Court. See Kobach v. U.S. Election Asst. Comm’n, 772 F. 3d 1183, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2014). 
Had Arizona and Kansas prevailed, the lawsuit would have obviated the need for the two-
tier voter registration system and allowed both states to implement the documentary-
proof-of-citizenship requirement with respect to all voters. However, the Tenth Circuit 
rejected the two states’ claims. Id. at 1199. 
 52. See Ari Berman, Separate and Unequal Voting in Arizona and Kansas, NATION 
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/176650/separate-and-unequal-voting-arizona- 
and-kansas; Fernanda Santos & John Eligon, 2 States Plan 2-Tier System for Balloting, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/us/2-states-plan-2-tier-
system-for-balloting.html. Georgia may also implement a two-tier system. See Liz 
Halloran, States Renew Battle to Require That Voters Prove Citizenship, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Nov. 19, 2013, ll:36 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/11/18/246015934/ 
states-renew-battle-to-require-that-voters-prove-citizenship; see also Jeremy Redmon, 
Georgia Voter Registration Law Partly Blocked, ATLANTA J. CONST. (June 20, 2013, 11:28 AM), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/national-govt-politics/georgia-voter-id-law-blocked/nYP9p.  
 53. See Belenky v. Kobach, No. 2013CV1331, slip op. at 26-27 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 
2016) (unpublished opinion).  
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implementation of proof-of-citizenship laws, obviating the federal law 
barriers that had previously prevented the state proof-of-citizenship 
laws from taking effect.54 Voting rights groups filed suit to halt the 
executive director’s action, but the proof-of-citizenship laws may 
remain in effect while the litigation remains pending.55 
 No one doubts the importance of ensuring that only eligible voters 
participate at the ballot box.56 The issue with proof-of-citizenship 
laws concerns the means states use to reach that goal. For instance, 
the documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirement in Kansas, 
combined with ineffective administrative implementation, have 
already caused major havoc for voters in that state. In September 
2013, the law had barred over 15,000 voter registration applicants 
from registering to vote.57 That number rose to over 22,000 by 
October 2014.58 By September 2015, the law prevented over 36,000 
would-be voters from registering to vote, and Kansas election officials 
began to purge these voters from the state’s list.59 The effect of these 
documentary-proof-of-citizenship laws may fall disproportionately on 
women. According to a 2006 study by the Brennan Center for Justice, 
7% of U.S. citizens lack ready access to citizenship documents, but 
“only 48% of voting-age women with ready access to their U.S. birth 
certificates have a birth certificate with [their] current legal name—
and only 66% of voting-age women with ready access to any proof of 
citizenship have a document with [their] current legal name.”60 
                                                                                                                  
 54. See Letter from Brian D. Newby, Exec. Dir., U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, to 
Brian Caskey, Election Dir., Kan. Office of Sec’y of State, at 1 (Jan. 29, 2016); Letter from 
Brian D. Newby, Exec. Dir., U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, to Hon. Brian P. Kemp, Ga. 
Sec’y of State, at 1 (Jan. 29, 2016); Letter from Brian D. Newby, Exec. Dir., U.S. Election 
Assistance Comm’n, to Hon. John H. Merrill, Ala. Sec’y of State, at 2 (Jan. 29, 2016).  
 55. See League of Women Voters v. Newby, No. 16-CV-236, at 4 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2016) 
(denying motion for temporary restraining order). 
 56. See Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed, When It Comes to Election Law, Red America and 
Blue America Are Not at All Alike, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1020-hasen-red-blue-election-law-20151020-
story.html (“All eligible voters, and only eligible voters, should have the right to easily 
register and cast a ballot that will be accurately counted.”). 
 57. See Brad Cooper, Would-be Voters Are Exasperated by Kansas’ New Registration 
Law, KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 2, 2013, 12:57 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-
government/article24755164.html.  
 58. See Peggy Lowe, Will Voting Problems Give Kansas an Election Night Limbo?, 
KCUR 89.3 (Oct. 31, 2014), http://kcur.org/post/will-voting-problems-give-kansas-election-
night-limbo. 
 59. Kelsey Ryan & Bryan Lowry, Young Voters, Witchitans Top Kansas’ Suspended 
Voter List, WICHITA EAGLE (Sept. 26, 2015, 4:35 PM), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-
government/article36705666.html. 
 60. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ 
POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION 2 (2006) 
(footnote omitted), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/citizens-without-proof. This 
report has drawn criticism. Compare HANS A. VON SPAKOVSKY & ALEX INGRAM, HERITAGE 
FOUND., WITHOUT PROOF: THE UNPERSUASIVE CASE AGAINST VOTER IDENTIFICATION 5 
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Because women are disproportionately unlikely to have access to 
these documents, they will have to obtain them, which may 
disproportionately burden women for the same reasons as the 
requirement that women must obtain voter ID documents. 
C.   Improper Voter Registration Database Maintenance Practices 
 Improper voter registration list maintenance may also 
disproportionately impact women. List maintenance is the act of 
removing ineligible voters from the voter registration rolls because 
the voter died, moved from the jurisdiction, was convicted of a felony, 
lacks U.S. citizenship, or has otherwise become ineligible.61 The 
National Voter Registration Act mandates that election officials 
perform list maintenance to remove ineligible voters from the 
registration rolls,62 but it also “provides procedures and  
standards . . . to assure that voters’ names are maintained on the 
rolls so long as they remain eligible to vote in their current 
jurisdiction . . . .”63 The Help America Vote Act requires states to 
match the names of voters on the voter registration rolls with other 
databases in order to verify voter registration applicants’ identity but 
leaves to states how to treat non-matches.64 Done properly, voter 
registration list maintenance is an ordinary and necessary element of 
proper election administration.65 Problems arise when election 
officials conduct their purges poorly. Often, the source of the problem 
is bad data. 
 Perhaps the most famous case of controversial voter purging is 
Florida’s pre-2000 effort to remove ineligible felons from the voter 
                                                                                                                  
(2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/without-proof-the-unpersuasive-
case-against-voter-identification, with Wendy Weiser et al., “Citizens Without Proof” 
Stands Strong, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
analysis/citizens-without-proof-stands-strong. 
 61. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art II, § 2 (citizenship); FLA. CONST., art VI, § 4 (non-felon); 
VA. CONST., art. II, § 1 (residency); N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 5-400(e) (McKinney 2015) (not 
deceased). 
 62. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(2)(A) (Supp. II 2014); see also H. REP. NO. 103-66, at 20-
22 (1993) (Conf. Rep.) (describing the list maintenance requirements). 
 63. S. REP. NO. 103-6, at 2 (1993) (discussing the list maintenance requirements); see 
also id. at 17-20; H. REP. NO. 103-9, at 14-19 (1993) (same). 
 64. See 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(5) (Supp. II 2014); see also Nathan Cemenska, HAVA’s 
Matching/ID Requirement: A Meaningless Tale Told by . . . Congress, 12 RICH. J.L. & PUB. 
INT. 27, 29 (2008). 
 65. See ROBERT F. BAUER ET AL., PRES. COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN 
VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION 
ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 27-29 (2014) [hereinafter BAUER-GINSBERG REPORT], 
http://www.supportthevoter.gov; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC’YS OF STATE, MAINTENANCE 
OF STATE VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS: A REVIEW OF RELEVANT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 4 
(2009), http://www.nass.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=792.  
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rolls:66 Florida election officials contracted with a data clearinghouse 
to compile a list of individuals with felony convictions, but officials 
specifically requested that the contractor make the list broader than 
necessary.67 In an e-mail to the contractor, an official from the 
Department of State wrote, “[o]bviously, we want to capture more 
names that possibly aren’t matches and let the supervisors make a 
final determination rather than exclude certain matches 
altogether.”68 Election officials used the overbroad list to remove 
voters from the registration rolls.69 In its investigation, U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights determined, “As a result [of the 
improperly administered purge], many Floridians were erroneously 
removed from the voter lists.”70 Journalists put the number of 
improperly purged voters anywhere between 1100 and 20,000.71 
 Notwithstanding the negative publicity over its pre-2000 felon 
purge, Florida continued to engage in controversial voter registration 
list maintenance practices. In 2005, the Florida Legislature enacted a 
statute barring individuals from registering to vote unless the state 
could verify either (1) that the applicant’s name and driver’s license 
number (or non-driver identification number) provided on the voter 
registration application matched the information in the state’s 
driver’s license database, or (2) the last four digits of a social security 
number listed on the applicant’s voter registration application 
matched the information in the Social Security Administration’s 
database.72 After litigation temporarily barred the state from 
enforcing its matching requirement,73 the Legislature amended the 
statute to permit registration of applicants who offered supplemental 
evidence of their identity in the event of a non-match.74 Subsequent 
litigation failed to block the amended statute.75 
                                                                                                                  
 66. See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NO. 005-902-00064-9, VOTING 
IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ch. 5 (2001), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/main.htm. The improper felon voter purge made 
an appearance in the made-for-television movie about the 2000 Florida recount. See 
RECOUNT: THE STORY OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (HBO 2008). 
 67. See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 66.  
 68. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting E-mail from Emmett “Bucky” Mitchell, Ass’t Gen. 
Counsel, Florida Dep’t of State, to DBT Online (Mar. 23, 1999)). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Katie Sanders, Bill Nelson Compares Rick Scott’s Voter Purge with a 2000 
Attempt, POLITIFACT FLA. (June 5, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.politifact.com/florida/ 
statements/2012/jun/05/bill-nelson/bill-nelson-compares-rick-scotts-voter-purge-2000-.  
 72. See FLA. STAT. § 97.053(6) (2005). 
 73. See Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 27, Fla. State Conf. of 
the NAACP v. Browning, No. 4:07-0042-CV-1-SPM-WCS (N.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2007), ECF 
No. 105, rev’d, 522 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 74. See FLA. STAT. § 97.053(6) (2007) (providing that in the event of a non-match, “the 
voter must provide evidence to the supervisor sufficient to verify the authenticity of the 
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 Other states implemented similar database matching requirements, 
with mixed results. For instance, Georgia administratively implemented 
a program similar to Florida’s, which flagged more than 4200 voters 
by the time litigation temporarily halted the program;76 yet, the 
program remains in force today.77 When the Washington Legislature 
enacted a similar statutory matching requirement, a court enjoined 
its enforcement.78 The Legislature subsequently amended the statute 
to allow voters to submit supplemental evidence of their identity in 
the event of a non-match.79 In one unique case, a private plaintiff 
unsuccessfully sued to force the Ohio Secretary of State to implement 
such a program.80 
 Florida, however, remains ground zero for controversy over voter 
registration list maintenance practices. Just prior to the 2012 
presidential election, Florida began a purge of suspected non-citizen 
voters.81 After initially suggesting that there were over 182,000 
illegally registered non-citizens, the Department of State later pared 
that number down to 2600, and eventually to 198 suspected non-
citizen voters—out of over 12 million total registered active voters in 
the state.82 Critics of the purge process, noting that the list of 
                                                                                                                  
number provided on the application. If the voter provides the necessary evidence, the 
supervisor shall place the voter’s name on the registration rolls”). The Legislature also 
made minor changes in 2008, just days prior to a hearing in the litigation over the 
provision. See FLA. STAT. § 97.053(6) (2008). 
 75. See FLA. STAT. § 97.053(6) (2015); Fla. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Browning, 569 
F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1259 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
 76. See Morales v. Handel, No. 08-CV-3172, 2008 WL 9401054 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 27, 
2008); Complaint Exhibit 6, Georgia v. Holder, 748 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2010) (three-
judge court) (No. 1:10-CV-1062), ECF No. 1-6 (describing the program); Bill Rankin, With 
Court Approval, State Continues to Verify Voters, ATLANTA J. CONST. (July 14, 2010, 6:55 
AM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/with-court-approval-state-continues-
to-verify-vote/nQhZN. 
 77. Holder, 748 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (2010) (order granting dismissal); see also Response 
to Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Joint Motion to Dismiss by Defendant-Intervenors at 3, 
Georgia v. Holder, 748 F. Supp. 2d 16 (2010) (noting the peculiar circumstances 
surrounding the Department of Justice’s decision to reverse its earlier determination by 
granting administrative preclearance after the filing of this litigation). 
 78. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.107 (2015); Wash. Ass’n of Churches v. Reed, 492 
F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (enjoining enforcement). 
 79. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.107 (2015). 
 80. See Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 582 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959-61 (S.D. Ohio), 
vacated, 555 U.S. 5 (2008). 
 81. See Marc A. Caputo, 58 Percent of Voters Targeted in Noncitizen Hunt Are 
Hispanic. Whites, GOP Least Likely to Face Purge, MIAMI HERALD: NAKED POL. (May 13, 
2012, 11:00 AM), http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2012/05/58-percent-of-
voters-targeted-in-noncitizen-hunt-are-hispanic-whites-gop-least-likely-to-face-purge.html.  
 82. Steve Bousquet & Michael Van Sickler, Renewed ‘Scrub’ of Florida Voter List Has 
Elections Officials on Edge, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 3, 2013, 8:59 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/renewed-scrub-of-florida-voter-list-has-
elections-officials-on-edge/2134695; see Annual Voter Registration Totals in the State of 
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suspected non-citizen voters included a decorated World War II 
veteran and an active duty Navy Captain (both United States 
citizens), charged that the lists of non-citizens were hopelessly 
inaccurate and filed lawsuits to enjoin the program, with varying 
degrees of success.83 After the Supreme Court invalidated a key part 
of the Voting Rights Act the following summer, the Secretary of State 
resumed the program.84 Although the Florida Department of State 
began using a new immigration database from the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security to check for non-citizens, this did not blunt 
criticism: opponents pointed out that the database was not designed 
for checking the citizenship status of registered voters and that even 
the Department of Homeland Security warned that its database was 
not a foolproof way to verify citizenship status.85 Eventually, the 
Secretary of State suspended the program.86 
 Florida is not the only state to face controversy over improper 
voter registration purges, though. Within the past few years alone, 
                                                                                                                  
Florida, FLA. DEP’T OF ST., http://election.dos.state.fl.us/NVRA/history.asp (last updated 
Sept. 30, 2015) (showing 12,038,571 active registered voters in 2012). 
 83. Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the 
purge program violated the National Voter Registration Act); Mi Familia Vota Educ. Fund 
v. Detzner, 891 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (finding that the Secretary of State had 
not obtained preclearance for the purge program, as required under the Voting Rights Act); 
United States v. Florida, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (refusing to enjoin the 
purge program under the National Voter Registration Act); see also Noah Pransky, 
#ProtectYourVote: Active Service Members Upset Over Removal from Voting Rolls, WTSP 10 
NEWS (Nov. 2, 2012, 4:04 PM), http://www.wtsp.com/news/topstories/article/280780/250/ 
ProtectYourVote-Service-members-removed-from-voting-rolls; Amy Sherman, South 
Florida Democrats Say Gov. Rick Scott Leading “Misguided” Effort to Purge Voters from 
State Rolls, MIAMI HERALD (May 29, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/05/29/ 
2822073/south-florida-democrat-say-gov.html. 
 84. Lizette Alvarez, Ruling Revives Florida Review of Voting Rolls, N.Y. TIMES  
(Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/us/ruling-revives-florida-review-of-
voting-rolls.html.  
 85. See Lizette Alvarez, Florida Defends New Effort to Clean Up Voter Rolls, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/us/florida-defends-new-effort-to-
clean-up-voter-rolls.html; see also Amy Sherman, One of the ‘Main Functions’ of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s SAVE Database Is ‘Checking Voter Registration 
Citizenship Status,’ Ken Detzner Says, POLITIFACT FLA. (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2013/nov/14/ken-detzner/main-functions-save-
database-department-homeland-s (rating Secretary of State’s statement as “[f]alse”); Amy 
Sherman, Homeland Security Warned That the SAVE Database Is Not Foolproof Way to 
Verify the Voter Rolls, LWV Says, POLITIFACT FLA. (Oct. 30, 2013, 1:36 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2013/oct/30/league-women-voters-florida/league- 
women-voters-says-homeland-security-warned- (rating the League of Women Voters’ 
statement as “[t]rue”).  
 86. See Steve Bousquet & Amy Sherman, Florida Halts Purge of Noncitizens from 
Voter Rolls, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014, 1:02 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/ 
news/politics/elections/florida-halts-purge-of-noncitizens-from-voter-rolls/2172206.  
2016]  NINETEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT 523 
 
Colorado, Iowa, Indiana, Ohio, Puerto Rico, Texas, and Virginia have 
all faced criticism and, in some cases, litigation over their list 
maintenance procedures.87 
 Women may disproportionately bear the burden of improper voter 
registration purges. Because the vast majority of women change their 
name following marriage,88 women are particularly vulnerable to 
problems related to database-matching: a database that lists a 
woman under her maiden name may report a non-match against the 
woman’s married name in the voter registration database (or an 
outdated voter registration record may not match up with an updated 
driver’s license or social security database). Former counsel for the 
plaintiffs in the Florida litigation reports that “yes, there were 
problems for married women who hadn’t changed their name on 
Social Security or DMV information (we know this to be true from 
anecdotes collected for litigation) . . . .”89 
 Along similar lines, consider the likelihood that among the 
millions of voters in a state’s voter registration database, a 
surprisingly large number are likely to share both a name and other 
identifying variables (like a date of birth) with another voter (the 
                                                                                                                  
 87.  See Colón-Marrero v. Vélez, 813 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2016) (invalidating Puerto 
Rico’s list maintenance procedure); Democratic Party of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 
No. 1:13-CV-1218, 2013 WL 5741486, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2013) (denying preliminary 
injunction against a list maintenance procedure); Common Cause of Colo. v. Buescher, 750 
F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1279 (D. Colo. 2010) (upholding a list maintenance procedure); see also 
Dan Casey, ‘Purged’ Voter’s Experience Raises Questions, ROANOKE TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013, 
7:00 PM), http://www.roanoke.com/news/columns_and_blogs/columns/dan_casey/purged-
voter-s-experience-raises-questions/article_90519971-e202-53d2-9f3a-81b0008d8f27.html; 
Jeff Eckhoff, Polk Judge Refuses to Throw Out Voting Rules Lawsuit Against Iowa Sec. of 
State Matt Schultz, DES MOINES REG. (Sept. 12, 2012, 11:04 AM), 
http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2012/09/12/polk-judge-refuses-to-throw-
out-voting-rules-lawsuit-against-iowa-sec-of-state-matt-schultz; Ivan Moreno, Colo. Furthers 
Citizenship Checks, DENVER POST (Oct. 23, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ 
recommended/ci_21838811; Lise Olsen, Texas’ Voter Purge Made Repeated Errors, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Nov. 2, 2012, 8:09 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/politics/article/Texas-voter-
purge-made-repeated-errors-4001767.php; Jim Siegel, Democrats Call Ohio’s Purgings of 
Voter Rolls Too Aggressive, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Dec. 3, 2015, 7:10 AM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/12/03/legislator-opposes-ohios-purgings-
of-voter-rolls-as-too-aggressive.html; Bill Turque, Voter Purge in Key Indiana County Goes 
Overboard, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2012/10/26/voter-purge-in-key-indiana-county-goes-overboard. 
 88. See Emens, supra note 25, at 785, 789. 
 89. E-mail from Justin Levitt, Assoc. Professor of Law, Loyola Univ. Sch. of Law, to 
Author (Aug. 28, 2013, 9:29 PM) (on file with author). Professor Levitt also cautioned that 
“there were enough other problems for men (‘James’ for ‘Jim,’ typos, compound names like 
Jean-Jacques) that there wasn’t a clear overall disparity,” id., but this is irrelevant to the 
question of whether database matching programs “den[y] or abridge[]” “[t]he right . . . to 
vote” of married women who change their names “on account of sex.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIX. Even if men also face name-related database matching burdens to a greater extent 
than women, this would not negate the fact that database matching programs may burden 
women’s right to vote on the basis of post-marriage name-changing, which is an action 
predominantly undertaken by women, not men. 
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“birthday problem”).90 When states conduct list maintenance using 
database matching, this leads to a surprising number of false positive 
matches,91 which could lead to a voter’s erroneous removal from the 
voter rolls if they share a name and birthdate with a felon, non-
citizen, deceased individual, or other ineligible voter. Because women 
are more likely to change their name following marriage,92 more 
women than men may be subject to the birthdate problem twice: once 
under their maiden name and once under their married name. 
D.   Cutbacks in Access: Early Voting, Election Day  
Registration, Third-Party Voter Registration Groups 
 States have long enacted a host of measures to make voting easier 
and more convenient. Lately, however, states have been repealing 
these popular measures in an effort to make voting more difficult; 
these cutbacks may have an acute impact on women. States’ actions 
have included reducing the availability of early voting, eliminating 
Election Day registration, and placing restrictions on third-party 
voter registration groups. 
 Of all the states to make voting more difficult, perhaps most 
controversial is North Carolina: in 2013, its General Assembly passed 
a law that managed to make voting more difficult on all three 
fronts—cutting the early voting period (while allowing for the same 
number of hours of early voting to be spread over the fewer number 
of days), eliminating a same-day registration provision that enabled 
voters to register and vote on the same day during the early voting 
period, and placing restrictions on third-party voter registration 
organizations.93 Other states, however, have imposed less 
comprehensive restrictions. 
 1.   Early Voting 
 First, consider early voting. Early voting is a procedure by which a 
voter, in the days leading up to Election Day, may appear in person 
at election officials’ office or another designated location to cast a 
                                                                                                                  
 90. See Michael P. McDonald & Justin Levitt, Seeing Double Voting: An Extension of 
the Birthday Problem, 7 ELECTION L.J. 111, 112-13 (2008). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Emens, supra note 25, at 785, 789. 
 93. See Voter Information Verification Act, ch. 381, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1505 
(codified in scattered sections of Chapter 163, N.C. GEN. STAT. (2014)). While litigation 
against the changes remains ongoing, a preliminary injunction is in effect to ensure the 
continued operation of same-day registration. But it does not apply to the early voting 
reductions nor the restrictions on third-party registration groups. See League of Women 
Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236, 248 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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ballot.94 Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia allow some 
form of early voting for all voters, for any reason.95 Beyond the 
benefits that early voting provides election administrators, early 
voting also makes voting more accessible to voters.96 
 Recently, some states have cut back on early voting. In 2011, 
Florida enacted a controversial law to reduce by nearly half the 
number of early voting days.97 A study of the law’s effects determined 
that “it very well could negatively impact turnout among Democratic, 
minority, younger[,] occasional, and first-time voters in the Sunshine 
State.”98 Litigation to stop the cutback yielded mixed results.99 After 
long lines at Florida polling places became a national story in the 
subsequent presidential election, the Legislature reinstated the full 
amount of early voting previously available.100 In 2012, a series of 
bizarre events led the Ohio General Assembly to enact, essentially by 
accident, an early voting regime which cut early voting hours, except 
for military voters.101 Litigation proceeding on a unique Bush v. Gore 
equal protection theory succeeded in opening up the full early voting 
availability to all voters.102  In 2013, Ohio’s General Assembly again 
reduced the days available for early voting.103 Litigation to block the 
                                                                                                                  
 94. DIANA KASDAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EARLY VOTING: WHAT WORKS 2-3 
(2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/early-voting-what-works.  
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. at 5-8; see also BAUER-GINSBERG REPORT, supra note 65, at 54-58. 
 97. FLA. STAT. § 101.657(d) (2011). The law also allowed, but did not require, local 
election administrators to offer the same number of hours of early voting as were 
previously available; the officials merely had to offer those hours over the shortened 
number of days. See id. 
 98. See Herron & Smith, supra note 14, at 347. 
 99. See Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (refusing to 
block the cutback in early voting); Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 299, 357 
(D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court) (partially blocking cutback in the five Florida counties 
then covered by the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act). 
 100. See FLA. STAT. § 101.657(d) (2013); see also Amanda Terkel, Florida Early Voting 
Fiasco: Voters Wait for Hours at Polls as Rick Scott Refuses to Budge, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 5, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/04/florida-early-
voting_n_2073119.html. 
 101. Although the discussion is too lengthy to quote here, the Sixth Circuit explained 
the bizarre events in detail. See Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 426-27 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 102. See id. at 437. 
 103. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3509.01(B)(2), (3) (LexisNexis 2014). 
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cuts settled, restoring some of the early voting period.104 Following 
the settlement, a different set of plaintiffs brought separate 
litigation, which is currently pending.105 
 2.   Election Day Registration 
 Second, consider Election Day registration. Most states require 
voters to file their voter registration application a certain number of 
days in advance of the election;106 voters who fail to do so may not 
vote in that election. Advance registration requirements impose a 
barrier to voting.107 Some states, however, allow voters to register to 
vote on Election Day itself,108 which eliminates the barrier by 
ensuring that any registration problems can be corrected by simply 
re-registering at the polls on Election Day.  
 Despite the benefits, the Maine Legislature repealed its Election 
Day registration regime, only to have voters reject the repeal in a 
referendum, reinstating Election Day registration.109 The Montana 
Legislature twice attempted to repeal that state’s Election Day 
registration law, only to face vetoes by two different governors.110 The 
Montana Legislature also authorized a referendum on the subject, 
but voters overwhelmingly chose to retain Election Day 
registration.111 Ohio’s General Assembly eliminated the week of early 
voting during which voters could simultaneously register to vote and 
cast a ballot.112 Litigation to block the removal settled without 
                                                                                                                  
 104. See Settlement Agreement Among Plaintiffs and Defendant Sec’y of State Jon 
Husted ¶ 10, Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 2:14-CV-404 (S.D. Ohio 
Apr. 17, 2015), ECF No. 111-1.  
 105. See Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, No. 2:15-CV-1802, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Ohio 
Dec. 4, 2015) (noting that a bench trial in the case concluded on Dec. 3, 2015). 
 106. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 97.055 (2015) (29 days); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 13.143 
(West 2015) (30 days). 
 107. See WENDY WEISER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTER REGISTRATION 
MODERNIZATION: POLICY SUMMARY 3-7 (2009). In the author’s experience as an election 
administrator, the single greatest category of election-day calls for assistance concerned 
voters with registration problems. 
 108. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 201.061(3) (2015); WIS. STAT. § 6.55 (2015).  
 109. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21A, § 122(4-A) (2011), repealed by People’s Veto 
(Nov. 8, 2011). 
 110. See H.B. 30, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Mont., as enrolled Apr. 9, 2013), vetoed, Veto 
Message from Gov. Steve Bullock, to Hon. Mark Blasdel, Speaker of the Mont. House of 
Reps., and Hon. Jeff Essmann, Pres. of the Mont. Sen. (Apr. 22, 2013); H.B. 180, 62d Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 2 (Mont., as enrolled Apr. 4, 2011), vetoed, Veto Message from Gov. Brian 
Schweitzer, to Hon. Mike Milburn, Speaker of the Mont. House, and Hon. Jim Peterson, 
Pres. of the Mont. Sen. (Apr. 13, 2011). 
 111. See S.B. 405, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Mont., as enrolled Apr. 22, 2013); Damon 
Daniels, Montana Voters Keep Same-Day Registration, DEMOS: POLICYSHOP (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.demos.org/blog/11/7/14/montana-voters-keep-same-day-registration. 
 112. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3509.01(B)(2), (3) (LexisNexis 2014). 
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restoring the period of same-day registration.113 Following the 
settlement, a different set of plaintiffs also brought separate 
litigation, which is currently pending.114  Wisconsin also cut its 
state’s early voting period.115 Litigation to restore the cuts is 
ongoing.116 
 3.   Third-Party Voter Registration Organizations 
 Finally, consider third-party voter registration organizations. The 
National Voter Registration Act requires that states accept written 
voter registration applications by applicants not physically present at 
the office of election officials.117 As a result, many organizations will 
send volunteers or staff into the community to find eligible but 
unregistered voters, offer them an opportunity to fill out an 
application, and mail in the application on the voter’s behalf. 
 Some states, however, impose restrictions on these groups. Three 
separate times over half a decade Florida enacted stringent 
requirements for these groups, backed by fines and penalties, only to 
have courts enjoin each law.118 In 2011, Texas enacted its own 
restrictions on third-party voter registration organizations, but 
litigants were less successful at seeking to overturn them.119 In 2005, 
New Mexico enacted similarly tough restrictions, which later 
litigation also failed to strike down.120 Plaintiffs had better luck in 
                                                                                                                  
 113. See Settlement Agreement Among Plaintiffs and Defendant Sec’y of State Jon 
Husted ¶ 10, Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 2:14-CV-404 (S.D. Ohio 
Apr. 17, 2015), ECF No. 111-1.  
 114. See Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, No. 2:15-CV-1802, slip op. at 1 (S.D. 
Ohio Dec. 4, 2015), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ 
ORDERregardingpost-trialbriefs120415.pdf (noting that a bench trial in the case concluded 
on Dec. 3, 2015). 
 115. See WIS. STAT. § 6.86(1)(b) (2011) (limiting early voting to a twelve-day period that 
begins on the third Monday preceding an election and ends on the Friday before Election 
Day). 
 116. See One Wis. Inst., Inc., v. Nichol, No. 3:15-CV-324, slip op. at 9-10 (W.D. Wis. 
Dec. 17, 2015), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/OneWisconsin-
Opinion121715.pdf (refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs’ “political fencing” claims). 
 117. 52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1) (Supp. II 2014). 
 118. See FLA. STAT. § 97.0575 (2011), enjoined, League of Women Voters of Fla. v. 
Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1167-68 (N.D. Fla. 2012); FLA. STAT. § 97.0575 (2007), 
enjoined, League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1325 (S.D. 
Fla. 2008); FLA. STAT. § 97.0575 (2005), enjoined, League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb, 
447 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
 119. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 13.031-.048 (West 2011), upheld by Voting for Am., 
Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 391-94 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 120. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-49 (2008), preliminary injunction denied, Am. Ass’n of 
People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1247 (D.N.M. 2008) (denying 
preliminary injunction); see also Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F. 
Supp. 2d 1183, 1189 (D.N.M. 2010) (granting in part and denying in part Secretary of 
State’s motion to dismiss), aff’d on reconsideration, No. CIV 08-0702 JB/WDS, 2010 WL 
3834049 (D.N.M. 2010). 
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Ohio, where they successfully attacked a 2006 statute restricting 
third-party voter registration drives.121 Georgia plaintiffs also 
obtained injunctive relief against an administrative practice that 
imposed similar burdens on third-party voter registration 
organizations.122 
 4.   The Effect on Women of Cutbacks in Access 
 Cutbacks in early voting, eliminating same-day registration, and 
restricting third-party voter registration organizations can burden all 
voters but may especially burden women voters. Because women 
carry a disproportionate share of the childcare burden in the United 
States,123 women may have a particular need for the flexibility these 
accessibility provisions afford voters. 
 A third-party voter registration drive at the school of a woman’s 
child might be the difference between that woman turning in her 
voter registration form before the deadline, or not. Expanded early 
voting might be the difference between a woman voting or not, 
because the following day she may be too busy with a sick daughter 
to wait in a polling place line. Same-day registration could be the 
difference for a woman who has only a half-hour to vote before she 
has to pick up her son from school and cannot remain at the polling 
place to sort out her registration problem. 
E.   Barriers to the Ballot: What It All Means 
 As the above discussion illustrates, a host of legislative and 
administrative matters present barriers to the ballot.124 Many of 
                                                                                                                  
 121. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3503.14(A), 3503.19(B)(2)(b)-(c), 3503.29(C), 
3599.11(B)(2)(a), 3599.11(C)(2) (2008), preliminary injunction granted, Project Vote v. 
Blackwell, 455 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 (N.D. Ohio 2006); see also Project Vote v. Blackwell, 
No. 1:06-CV-1628, 2008 WL 397585, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2008) (granting plaintiff’s 
motion for partial summary judgment). 
 122. See Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
 123. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 34, at 181-82; Coan, supra note 34, at 258; Dowd, supra 
note 34, at 1053-54. 
 124. The barriers mentioned above are hardly the only recent restrictions imposed on 
voting. For instance, the above discussion does not mention efforts to make voting more 
difficult for students. See, e.g., CAMPUS VOTE PROJECT, FAIR ELECTIONS LEGAL NETWORK, 
COLLEGE STUDENTS AND VOTING: A CAMPUS VOTE PROJECT PERSPECTIVE 5-9 (2013), 
http://fairelectionsnetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2013-Student-Voting-Report-Handout-
DRAFT.pdf. The gender gap in higher education enrollment is not as pronounced as in 
other areas: “In college, over half of both undergraduate (55 percent) and graduate 
students (57 percent) were women. Combining undergraduate and graduate levels, women 
made up 53 percent of all college students in 2011 . . . .” JESSICA DAVIS & KURT BAUMAN, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NO. P20-571, SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 
13 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-571.pdf. It is harder to draw the 
conclusion that attacks on student voting are restrictions “on account of sex,” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIX, than it is to draw a similar conclusion about restrictions that burden those 
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these barriers may impact women significantly more than men.125 
The question then is what, if anything, can the Nineteenth 
Amendment do to help? 
III.   LEGAL HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE LEADING 
 TO THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT 
 When trying to determine the scope of the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s power to fight restrictions on voting, it is appropriate 
to review the history leading to the proposal and ratification of the 
Amendment.126 
A.   Early American History: New Jersey 
 Some early American women were, in fact, entitled to vote: New 
Jersey’s Constitution of 1776 did not restrict the franchise on account 
of sex.127 Women, in fact, voted in New Jersey until 1807.128 That 
year, the Legislature barred women from voting, ostensibly justifying 
its decision on the questionable ground of fighting voter fraud.129 In 
an eerie foreshadowing of today’s voting restrictions,130 voter fraud 
                                                                                                                  
without financial resources, or those with childcare responsibilities, or those who change 
their name—all of which are categories which contain significantly more women than men. 
 125. Although this Article focuses on barriers to the ballot that impact women, this 
does not foreclose the possibility that the Nineteenth Amendment could protect the voting 
rights of men. After all, the Nineteenth Amendment “applies to men and women alike.”  
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937). Voting rights advocates might use the 
Nineteenth Amendment to protect military voters, because significantly more men than 
women serve in the military. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2012, at 335 tbl.510 (2012), http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/ 
2011/compendia/statab/131ed/tables/defense.pdf. Advocates might similarly use the 
Nineteenth Amendment to attack felony disenfranchisement statutes: the impact of these 
provisions falls almost exclusively on men. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT RATES FOR WOMEN 2 (2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
doc/publications/fd_bs_women.pdf. 
 126. Siegel, supra note 7, at 967-68 (arguing that a proper interpretation of the 
Nineteenth Amendment must include a review of the history leading to its enactment). 
 127. See N.J. CONST. of 1776, ¶ IV, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 2595 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
 128. See Jan Ellen Lewis, Rethinking Women’s Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807, 63 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1017, 1024-25 (2011). 
 129. See Supplement to an Act to Regulate the Election of Members of the Legislative 
Council and General Assembly, Sheriffs and Coroners in New Jersey, November 1807, 
1807 N.J. Laws 14; see also Lewis, supra note 128, at 1029-33. 
 130. See Keyssar, supra note 11 (“The [modern restrictive voting] laws seem tailored 
less to guarantee the integrity of elections than to achieve a partisan purpose . . . .”); see 
also HASEN, supra note 2, at 41-73 (detailing the cottage industry of individuals who 
peddle less than compelling claims of voter fraud to defend restrictions on voting).  
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may have been merely a pretext for disenfranchising women because 
the Legislature did not like the way in which women were voting.131 
B.   Reconstruction Era and the Civil War Amendments 
 During Reconstruction, woman suffrage suffered a setback when 
Congress considered a constitutional amendment designed to secure 
the rights, including the right to vote, of newly-freed slaves. Despite 
the vigorous campaigning of woman suffrage supporters, Congress 
proposed a Fourteenth Amendment that protected the voting rights 
of only male voters.132 Suffragists fared no better when Congress 
proposed the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited restrictions on 
suffrage on account of race, but made no mention of sex.133 
 In a last gasp effort at constitutional protection, woman suffrage 
advocates unsuccessfully attempted to obtain their own 
constitutional amendment, specifically guaranteeing for women the 
right to vote.134 As an alternative, advocates lobbied Congress to pass 
ordinary legislation, purporting to enforce the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that would 
require states to enfranchise women.135 Members of Congress, who 
once embraced a broad notion of suffrage and of congressional power 
to protect the right to vote, now rejected requests for legislation on 
the grounds that protecting the voting rights of women was beyond 
the power of Congress.136 
                                                                                                                  
 131. See CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT & NETTIE ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND 
POLITICS: THE INNER STORY OF THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 9 (2005); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, 
THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 141 
(rev. ed. 2009); Irwin N. Gertzog, Female Suffrage in New Jersey, 1790-1807, 10 
WOMEN & POL. 47, 56 (1990). But see Lewis, supra note 128, at 1033-34 (suggesting that 
the real motivation may have been a genuine conviction concerning women’s competence to 
vote, rather than a politically motivated concern about election outcomes). 
 132. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, § 2, XV. Woman suffrage advocates lobbied 
tirelessly to ensure the Reconstruction Amendments explicitly enfranchised women—or at 
least used only gender-neutral language when enfranchising former slaves—but were 
unable to overcome the political concerns of supporters in Congress who feared that the 
inclusion of woman suffrage would jeopardize black suffrage. See CATT & SHULER, supra 
note 131, at 49-52; KEYSSAR, supra note 131, at 143-44; Lind, supra note 9, at 162, 164-65; 
Siegel, supra note 7, at 968-69, n.58. 
 133. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV; CATT & SHULER, supra note 131, at 67-72; KEYSSAR, 
supra note 131, at 145; Siegel, supra note 7, at 969-70.  
 134. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 131, at 71; Siegel, supra note 7, at 970; Adam 
Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,” 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1475 (2001). 
 135. See Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
1331, 1366 (1995); Siegel, supra note 7, at 972-73; Winkler, supra note 134, at 1479, 1484, 
1499. 
 136. See Siegel, supra note 7, at 973; Winkler, supra note 134, at 1489-91, 1502. 
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C.   Minor v. Happersett137 and the “New Departure” 
 Having failed before Congress, woman suffrage advocates turned 
to the courts. Notwithstanding the explicit mention of “male” voters 
in Section 3, suffragists argued that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment included voting as 
one of the protected “privileges and immunities.”138 Section 1 
contained no explicit limitation on the basis of sex, the argument 
went, so women were entitled to vote.139 Suffragists titled this theory 
the “New Departure.”140 
 Although the criminal prosecution of noted suffragist Susan B. 
Anthony for illegally voting may be the most famous New Departure 
case,141 the case to reach the Supreme Court was Minor v. 
Happersett.142 Virginia Minor, the founder of the New Departure 
movement, applied for voter registration in her home state of 
Missouri.143 The registrar rejected her application on the grounds 
that she was a woman and that Missouri law limited the franchise to 
men.144 Minor sued the registrar, but she lost in both the trial court 
and the Missouri Supreme Court.145 In the United States Supreme 
Court, Minor advanced the standard New Departure arguments.146 In 
a unanimous opinion, the Court rejected Minor’s claim.147 
                                                                                                                  
 137. 88 U.S. 162 (21 Wall.) (1874), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 138. See Siegel, supra note 7, at 971-72; Winkler, supra note 134, at 1475-76, 1480-83, 
1485-87. 
 139. See KEYSSAR, supra note 131, at 145-46; Lobel, supra note 135, at 1365. Although 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause was the primary constitutional provision on which 
the New Departure relied, the theory invoked other constitutional clauses as well. See 
Siegel, supra note 7, at 972 n.66. 
 140. See Lobel, supra note 115, at 1365; Siegel, supra note 7, at 971. 
 141. See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459). 
The fascinating full story of the case appears in several law review articles, a full-length 
book, and even an episode of the 1950s television series You Are There. See generally CATT 
& SHULER, supra note 131, at 99-104; N.E.H. HULL, THE WOMAN WHO DARED TO VOTE: 
THE TRIAL OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY (2012); Lobel, supra note 135, at 1368-70; Winkler, supra 
note 134, at 1506-14; You Are There: The Trial of Susan B. Anthony (CBS television 
broadcast Jan. 23, 1955). 
 142. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. The 
Anthony and Minor cases were not the only New Departure test cases: “Overall, 150 
women attempted to vote in ten states and the District of Columbia during 1871 and 1872.” 
Winkler, supra note 134, at 1493. Usually, the local registrar denied the woman’s voter 
registration application, so the woman would sue the registrar. CATT & SHULER, supra note 
131, at 92; Lobel, supra note 135, at 1368; Winkler, supra note 134, at 1492. 
 143. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 163. For an examination of Minor’s role in the 
suffrage movement, see Winkler, supra note 134, at 1475-76. 
 144. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 163-64. 
 145. See Minor v. Happersett, 53 Mo. 58, 65 (1873), aff’d, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 178. 
 146. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 164. 
 147. See id. at 178. Incredibly, the Court rejected Minor’s claim even though Missouri 
sent no counsel to defend the decision below. See id. at 174 (“No opposing counsel”). 
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 First, the Court agreed that Minor was a citizen of the United 
States. Women, the Court held, had always been citizens from the 
founding of the Republic and did not need Section 1 of the Fourteenth  
Amendment148 to stake a claim to citizenship:149  
The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment did not affect the citizenship of 
women any more than it did of men. In this particular, therefore, 
the rights of Mrs. Minor do not depend upon the [A]mendment. 
She has always been a citizen from her birth, and entitled to all 
the privileges and immunities of citizenship.150 
 The Court, however, rejected Minor’s claim that voting was one of 
the “privileges and immunities” guaranteed to citizens.151 The Court 
explained: 
For nearly ninety years the people have acted upon the idea that 
the Constitution, when it conferred citizenship, did not necessarily 
confer the right of suffrage. . . .   
[T]he Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of 
suffrage upon any one, and . . . the constitutions and laws of the 
several States which commit that important trust to men alone are 
not necessarily void . . . .152 
 Although the Court rejected the New Departure theory, the 
justices expressed no opinion on the merits of woman suffrage, 
explaining that such a policy question was not within the judiciary’s 
purview.153 Taking the Court’s disclaimer as a suggestion, some 
suffrage advocates embarked on state-by-state campaigns to convince 
states and localities to enfranchise women.154 But others nonetheless 
brought their fight back to Congress, where they lobbied once again 
for a constitutional amendment.155 
                                                                                                                  
 148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside.”). 
 149. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 165-70.  
 150. Id. at 170.  
 151. Id. at 170-78. The Court also rejected claims that the denial of woman suffrage 
violated the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4, the Bill of Attainder Clause, id. art. 
I, § 9, cl. 3, and the Due Process Clause, id. amend. V. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 175-76. 
 152. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 177-78. 
 153. Id. at 178. 
 154. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 131, at 107-31, 160-226; KEYSSAR, supra note 131, 
at 149. 
 155. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 131, at 227-49; KEYSSAR, supra note 131, at 149. 
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D.   The Pre-Nineteenth Amendment History: What It All Means 
 The key events in the pre-Nineteenth Amendment history—New 
Jersey’s withdrawal of suffrage from women on dubious grounds of 
voter fraud, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’ protection of 
voting rights for men only, the refusal of Congress to enact 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to protect women’s 
right to vote, and Minor v. Happersett’s holding that the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause does not protect voting—collectively tell a 
story in which voting rights are subject to the whims of individual 
states, entitled to only minimal protection from the federal 
government. The Nineteenth Amendment, as a constitutional 
rejection of that history,156 constitutes more than just a requirement 
that states remove the word “male” from their list of voter 
qualifications. 
 Rather, the rejection of this pre-amendment history suggests that 
the Nineteenth Amendment constitutes a significant source of 
constitutional authority for the defense of voting rights in general 
against restrictions or barriers that discriminate on the basis of sex. 
The extent of that power—whether that power is sufficient to combat 
modern-day barriers to the ballot—is illustrated both by the 
Nineteenth Amendment’s legislative history and by inferences from 
the jurisprudence of the era concerning the enforcement clauses in 
other constitutional provisions. 
                                                                                                                  
 156. To illustrate how the Nineteenth Amendment was a rejection of the pre-
Amendment constitutional history, consider that, in their pleas for a constitutional 
amendment to enfranchise women, suffrage advocates never truly gave up on their New 
Departure theory, despite their total defeat in the Supreme Court. See Siegel, supra note 7, 
at 975.  Indeed, a report of the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage specifically 
mentioned New Jersey’s 1807 revocation of the franchise from women, and said, “History is 
largely an account of man’s struggle for freedom, and from the beginning of the human 
race, down to the present time, its tendency has been toward liberty—mankind reaching 
out for freedom and immeasurably attaining it.” S. REP. NO. 63-64, at 8 (1913); see also id. 
at 7 (noting “marked changes in political and social conditions in the U.S.”). 
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IV.   HOW ITS FRAMERS UNDERSTOOD THE  
NINETEENTH AMENDMENT157 
 In 1919, woman suffrage advocates finally succeeded: both 
chambers in the Sixty-Sixth Congress voted by the necessary two-
thirds majority to propose a woman suffrage constitutional 
amendment to the states.158 Just over a year later, the necessary 
three-fourths of state legislatures ratified the Nineteenth 
Amendment.159 
A.   Legislative Procedure Surrounding  
House Joint Resolution 1160 
 The most peculiar fact about the legislative history of the 
Nineteenth Amendment is how little history there is: members of 
Congress went to great lengths to hurry the consideration of the joint 
resolution which eventually became the Nineteenth Amendment. 
Neither chamber held any hearings, nor took any testimony; the 
House published a report of only forty-four words while the Senate 
issued no published report at all.161 Unique parliamentary 
maneuvers—what one opponent called “parliamentary cleverness”162 
and another called “revolutionary tactics . . . in order to railroad a 
piece of legislation through”163—deviated from standard practice with 
the goal of speeding consideration of the joint resolution.  In the 
House, woman suffrage supporters used the rare “Calendar 
                                                                                                                  
 157. This Part discusses only the legislative history of Congress proposing the 
Nineteenth Amendment. State legislatures of the time generally did not maintain verbatim 
transcripts of proceedings akin to the Congressional Record; they merely maintained 
journals of proceedings, which offer the reader procedural details but not the substance of 
the discussion. Cf. Eric S. Fish, Note, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment Enforcement Power, 
121 YALE L.J. 1168, 1203 n.160 (2012) (encountering similar problems concerning state 
legislatures’ debates over the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment). An 
authoritative secondary source published shortly after ratification, however, suggests that 
the ratification debates in the state legislatures were substantially similar to the debates 
in Congress. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 131, at 343-63, 371-80, 387-413, 422-61. 
 158. See H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th Cong. (1919); see also 58 CONG. REC. 635 (recording 
passage of H.R.J. Res. 1 in the Senate on June 4, 1919, by a vote of 56-25); id. at 93-94 
(recording passage of H.R.J. Res. 1 in the House on May 21, 1919, by a vote of 304-90). 
 159. See Certification of the Adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, 41 Stat. 1823 (1920). 
 160. See H.R.J. Res. 1.  
 161. See H.R. REP. NO. 66-1 (1919). The report reads, in its entirety, “The Committee 
on Woman Suffrage, to which was referred the resolution (H.R.J. Res. 1) proposing an 
amendment to the Constitution extending the right of suffrage to women, after 
consideration, report the said resolution back to the House with a recommendation that it 
do pass.” Id. The Senate’s Committee on Woman Suffrage merely reported the joint 
resolution without a published report. See 58 CONG. REC. 348 (1919). 
 162. 58 CONG. REC. 78 (1919) (statement of Rep. Joseph Moore). 
 163. Id. at 228 (statement of Sen. Underwood); see also id. (statement of Sen. Oscar 
Underwood) (“revolutionary methods”). 
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Wednesday” provision to bypass the Rules Committee and obtain 
swift consideration of the joint resolution.164 In the Senate, woman 
suffrage supporters unsuccessfully attempted an innovative use of 
the motion to discharge a committee to bring the matter to the floor 
sooner, scaring opponents into allowing the joint resolution to reach 
the floor without delay.165 A mere eighteen days into the Sixty-Sixth 
                                                                                                                  
 164. Without first having its Democratic members formally appointed, see 58 CONG. 
REC. 11 (1919) (appointing only Republican members), the House Committee on Woman 
Suffrage met on the first day of the new Congress (Monday) and reported out House Joint 
Resolution 1 the very next day (Tuesday). See H.R. REP. NO. 66-1 (1919). The joint 
resolution was referred to the House Calendar. See 58 CONG. REC. 70 (1919). The day after 
its referral (Wednesday), Representative James Mann of Illinois, the Chairman of the 
Committee and the chief sponsor of House Joint Resolution 1, used the “Calendar 
Wednesday” provision to call up the joint resolution for immediate consideration.  See id. at 
78; see also RULES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 66th Cong., Rule XXIV, cl. 7 
(1919) [hereinafter HOUSE RULES] (providing for the Calendar Wednesday procedure), 
reprinted in H. R. DOC. NO. 66-1019, at 393-94 (1921). 
Under normal practice not followed in this instance, a legislative item reported by any 
House committee makes an additional stop at the Rules Committee. The Rules Committee 
examines the item anew, and proposes a privileged resolution which would order the House 
to consider the underlying legislative item under debate rules unique to the item. The 
House makes frequent use of this procedure because consideration of the Rules 
Committee’s proposed resolution is a privileged question, which means the resolution gets 
immediate consideration over other business then pending. See HOUSE RULES, Rule XI, cl. 
56, reprinted in H. R. DOC. NO. 66-1019, at 309-10. When the House passes the Rules 
Committee’s resolution, the House is bound by the resolution’s terms, which usually dictate 
that the underlying legislative item itself now receives immediate consideration over other 
business then pending and also dictate special debate rules for that consideration. See, e.g., 
H. Res. 215, 65th Cong. (1918) (providing for immediate consideration of H.R.J. Res. 200, 
the 65th Congress’s version of a constitutional amendment proposing woman suffrage); 56 
CONG. REC. 762, 770 (1918) (using H. Res. 215 in the 65th Congress to manage debate on 
H.R.J. Res. 200). 
Under the Calendar Wednesday procedure, however, a committee may obtain immediate 
consideration of a reported item on the House Calendar, without the necessity of going 
through the Rules Committee, but may do so only on a Wednesday. See HOUSE RULES, 
supra, Rule XXIV, cl. 7, reprinted in H. R. DOC. NO. 66-109, at 393-94. 
By immediately considering House Joint Resolution 1 in committee, reporting it 
favorably, and immediately placing it on the House Calendar before Wednesday, 
Representative Mann was able to use the Calendar Wednesday provision to bypass the 
Committee on Rules and bring the joint resolution to the floor immediately. Had 
Representative Mann waited even another day to report the joint resolution, it would not 
have been eligible for the Calendar Wednesday procedure until the following Wednesday, 
by which time other committees might have reported their own measures which would also 
be eligible for the Calendar Wednesday procedure. 
Another unique benefit of the Calendar Wednesday procedure was that it limited debate, 
see id. at Rule XV, cl. 6(b), preventing members from using debate as a means of blocking a 
vote. As a result, the House voted that same day by the necessary two-thirds majority to 
propose the joint resolution to the states as a constitutional amendment. See 58 CONG. 
REC. 93-94 (1919) (passing H.J. Res. 1 in the House by vote of 304-90).  
 165. Immediately upon receiving the joint resolution from the House, Senator Hiram 
Johnson unsuccessfully attempted to place the joint resolution on the calendar without the 
necessity of committee consideration. See 58 CONG. REC. 128 (1919). The Vice President 
referred the joint resolution to the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage. See 58 CONG. 
REC. 128 (1919). Senator Wesley Jones then immediately entered a motion to discharge the 
Committee from consideration of House Joint Resolution 1. See id. at 129. Pursuant to the 
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Congress, large majorities in both chambers had passed a sweeping 
change to the Constitution, resulting in the single biggest one-time 
enfranchisement of any group of individuals in the history of the 
United States.166 Congress is not known for its swift action in the 
normal course of legislating, and for the typically slow-moving 
institution to have moved with such speed on such an important 
issue seems curious, to put it mildly. 
 Congress apparently moved with such speed because previous 
Congresses built up a significant record over the course of previous 
decades. The first vote on a woman suffrage constitutional 
amendment came in the Senate in 1887.167 Congress had been 
holding and publishing hearings on the subject of a woman suffrage 
constitutional amendment since at least 1892 in the House and 1878 
                                                                                                                  
Senate’s rules, the motion had to lie over for one legislative day before it could receive a 
vote. See STANDING RULES OF THE U.S. SENATE, 66th Cong., Rule XXVI, ¶ 2 (1919), 
reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 66-427, at 31 (1921). 
Senator Andrieus Jones, the Chair of the Committee on Woman Suffrage, called a 
meeting of the Committee the following day. See 58 CONG. REC. 226-27 (1919) (statement of 
Sen. Andrieus Jones) (detailing the Saturday meeting). This was itself somewhat 
controversial, because although Senator Andrieus Jones, a Democrat, chaired the 
Committee in the previous Democratic-controlled Sixty-Fifth Congress, he would not do so 
in the Republican-controlled Sixty-Sixth Congress. See Republicans Win Senate and House, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1918, at 3. At Senator Andrieus Jones’ request, the Committee decided 
to support the previous day’s motion by Senator Wesley Jones to discharge the committee 
of House Joint Resolution 1, rather than follow the usual practice of reporting the joint 
resolution itself. See 58 CONG. REC. 228 (1919) (statement of Sen. Andrieus Jones). Several 
Senators vehemently protested that this constituted an abuse of the motion to discharge 
and that the Senate should follow the usual practice so as to allow all sides to express their 
views. See id. at 227-28 (statement of Sen. Oscar Underwood); id. at 231 (Statement of Sen. 
Hoke Smith); id. at 232-33 (statements of Sen. Thomas Gore); id. at 232 (statement of Sen. 
Albert Fall). A parliamentary battle ensued, involving a host of procedural mechanisms, 
until finally opponents ran out the clock, when another matter automatically arose by 
operation of a previously-enacted special order and preempted any vote on the motion to 
discharge. See id. at 235. 
Having failed in their efforts to discharge the Committee by motion, suffrage supporters 
resigned themselves to following the normal practice, and the Committee reported House 
Joint Resolution 1 favorably to the Senate. See id. at 343, 348. A few days later, the Senate 
took up the joint resolution, see id. at 556, and the following day, the Senate voted by the 
necessary two-thirds majority to propose the joint resolution to the states as a 
constitutional amendment. See id. at 635 (recording passage of H.J. Res. 1 in the Senate by 
a vote of 56-25). 
 166. See 58 CONG. REC. 1, 5 (1919) (beginning of Sixty-Sixth Congress on May 19, 
1919); id. at 93-94 (recording passage of H.J. Res. 1 in the House on May 21, 1919, by a 
vote of 304-90); id. at 635 (recording passage of H.J. Res. 1 in the Senate on June 4, 1919, 
by a vote of 56-25). For a discussion of how radical a change the Ninteenth Amendment 
made in the electorate, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 419 
(2005). But see KEYSSAR, supra note 131, at 175-77 (stating that the enfranchisement of 
women did not dramatically affect politics). 
 167. See 18 CONG. REC. 1002-03 (1887) (failing to pass S. Res. 5 in the Senate by a vote 
of 26-34). 
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in the Senate.168 Congressional committees had issued reports on a 
potential woman suffrage constitutional amendment since 1883 in 
the House and 1878 in the Senate.169 Just months earlier, the Sixty-
Fifth Congress narrowly missed the necessary two-thirds majority to 
propose the woman suffrage constitutional amendment to the 
states.170 When suffrage opponents asked supporters about the 
absence of hearings and reports on the subject in the Sixty-Sixth 
Congress, supporters replied that “hearings have been had on this 
resolution for more than [fifty] years”171 and that “[h]earings have 
been repeatedly held by committees of both House and Senate on this 
question in the past.”172 Relying on the record built in previous 
Congresses, the Sixty-Sixth Congress felt no need to study the merits 
or consequences of a woman suffrage constitutional amendment.173 
 For interpretive purposes, this means that debates, reports, 
hearings, and other legislative materials from previous Congresses 
can be just as useful as would be materials from the Sixty-Sixth 
Congress, which actually passed the Nineteenth Amendment. But 
the notion raises problems: is it proper to use the materials of a 
previous Congress to interpret a constitutional provision, when that 
Congress failed to pass (or even worse, voted down) a joint resolution 
proposing that provision? The reverse question also raises problems: 
is it proper to ignore the record developed by previous Congresses 
when the Sixty-Sixth Congress clearly relied on that record? 
Although some scholars use the entire half-century history of 
congressional efforts on woman suffrage,174 an intermediate position 
                                                                                                                  
 168. See Hearing of the Woman Suffrage Association: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 52d Cong. (1892); Arguments in Behalf of a Sixteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Privileges and Elections, 
45th Cong. (1878). These are the first published hearings; Congress held unpublished 
hearings preceding these. 
 169. See H.R. REP. NO. 47-1997 (1883); S. REP. NO. 45-523 (1878). 
 170. See 57 CONG. REC. 3062 (1919) (showing that, on reconsideration, H.R.J. Res. 200 
did not achieve the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate, failing by a vote of 55-29); 
56 CONG. REC. 10,987-88 (showing that, on the initial vote, H.R.J. Res. 200 did not achieve 
the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate, failing by a vote of 53-31); 56 CONG. REC. 
810 (1918) (showing that H.R.J. Res. 200 passed in the House by the necessary two-thirds 
majority with a vote of 274-136). 
 171. See 58 CONG. REC. 78 (1919) (statement of Rep. James Mann). 
 172. See id. at 557 (statement of Sen. James Watson). 
 173. Notably, state legislatures also moved with incredible speed to ratify the 
Nineteenth Amendment. Many legislative sessions had already concluded by the time 
Congress passed House Joint Resolution 1, so these states had to call their legislatures into 
special session in order to ratify the Amendment. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 131, at 
343-63. In under fourteen months, the necessary three-fourths of state legislatures ratified 
the Nineteenth Amendment. See Amendment to the Constitution, 1920, 41 Stat. 1823, 
1823 (1920) (certifying ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures on  
Aug. 26, 1920). 
 174. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 7, at 948 (interpreting the Nineteenth Amendment in 
light of over a half-century of hearings, reports, and debates). 
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is more appropriate: legislative history from a previous Congress is 
useful only if the members of Congress producing the statements or 
other materials also sat in the Sixty-Sixth Congress. This limiting 
principle ensures that activity from prior Congresses might be 
plausibly ascribed to the Sixty-Sixth Congress. 
B.   Enfranchising Women: The Nineteenth  
Amendment’s Primary Purpose 
 Having decided what materials are fair game to consider when 
attempting to discern Congress’s intent in proposing the Nineteenth 
Amendment, the next question is what exactly does the Nineteenth 
Amendment do? Absent enforcement legislation, how far does the 
Nineteenth Amendment itself reach into the states’ election 
machinery? 
 1.   Judicial Interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment 
 Given the circumstances of the case, one can forgive the Supreme 
Court for taking a cramped view of that question in Breedlove v. 
Suttles—the only case in which the Court has applied the Nineteenth 
Amendment.175 In Breedlove, the Court held that the Nineteenth 
Amendment does not prohibit the denial of the right to vote for 
failure to pay a poll tax with an exemption for female non-voters.176 
Nearly 100 years after its ratification, the following 201 words are 
the only judicial application of the Nineteenth Amendment the Court 
has ever offered: 
  The Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in 1920, declares: “The 
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” It 
applies to men and women alike and by its own force supersedes 
inconsistent measures, whether federal or state. Its purpose is not 
to regulate the levy or collection of taxes. The construction for 
which appellant contends would make the [A]mendment a 
limitation upon the power to tax. The payment of poll taxes as a 
prerequisite to voting is a familiar and reasonable regulation long 
enforced in many states and for more than a century in Georgia. 
That measure reasonably may be deemed essential to that form of 
levy. Imposition without enforcement would be futile. Power to 
                                                                                                                  
 175. 302 U.S. 277 (1937). The Court technically also applied the Nineteenth 
Amendment in Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922). In that case, the Supreme Court 
rejected a claim to remove two women from the voter rolls because although the state 
constitution limited suffrage to men, the operation of the Nineteenth Amendment forbid 
the state from enforcing its “men only” voter qualification. Id. at 135-36. The main question 
in that case was not, however, the operation of the Nineteenth Amendment, but rather 
whether it had validly become part of the Constitution. Id. at 136. 
 176. See 302 U.S. at 283-84. 
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levy and power to collect are equally necessary. And, by the 
exaction of payment before registration, the right to vote is neither 
denied nor abridged on account of sex. It is fanciful to suggest that 
the Georgia law is a mere disguise under which to deny or abridge 
the right of men to vote on account of their sex. The challenged 
enactment is not repugnant to the Nineteenth Amendment.177 
 The challenged poll tax exemption applied differently to men and 
women; only female non-voters were eligible for the exemption—that 
is, in order to be eligible for the exemption, women had to give up 
their right to vote.178 No voters were exempt from the poll tax on 
account of sex; the statute operated equally to deny both nonpaying 
men’s and nonpaying women’s rights to vote. Breedlove therefore 
stands for the unremarkable proposition that “the right to vote is 
neither denied nor abridged on account of sex”179 by a voting 
restriction unless that restriction in some way impacts voters of one 
sex differently from voters of another sex.180 
 Breedlove does contain some dicta suggesting that the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s reach is somewhat limited: that the provision’s 
“purpose is not to regulate the levy or collection of taxes” and that the 
Nineteenth Amendment is not “a limitation upon the power to tax.”181 
Modern readers should give these statements little credence: less 
than three decades after Breedlove, both the Supreme Court and a 
constitutional amendment would repudiate poll taxes,182 overruling 
Breedlove’s equal protection holding and casting doubt on that case’s 
cramped view of the Nineteenth Amendment’s reach.  
 Breedlove, then, offers little in the way of interpretive guidance. 
Because the Court’s Nineteenth Amendment jurisprudence is nearly 
non-existent, the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1 
might offer more insight. 
 2.   Legislative History 
 Had the Breedlove Court surveyed the legislative history of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, the Court probably would have found little 
to either buttress or rebut its dicta concerning the Amendment’s 
limited reach. Congress primarily thought that the Nineteenth 
Amendment would override state voter qualifications in order to 
                                                                                                                  
 177. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Curiously, the Court cited Minor v. 
Happersett for the proposition that the Nineteenth Amendment should be interpreted 
narrowly. See id. at 283 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 170 (1874)).  
 178. See GA. CODE § 92-108 (1933). 
 179. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 284.  
 180. See id. at 283-84. 
 181. Id. at 283. 
 182. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 
(1966). 
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make women eligible to vote and gave less consideration to whether 
the provision would alter the procedures governing state election 
regimes. 
 For instance, the descriptive clause of House Joint Resolution 1 
described the measure as “[p]roposing an amendment to the 
Constitution extending the right of suffrage to women.”183 The forty-
four word report of the House Committee on Woman Suffrage used 
identical language.184 Similarly, the more developed committee 
reports published by earlier Congresses opined on the wisdom of 
whether women should vote at all, not how to stop gender-based 
barriers like the poll tax at issue in Breedlove.185 Testimony in the 
hearings of previous Congresses centered on the grant or complete 
denial of, not lesser restrictions on, the right to vote.186 Much of the 
debate in both the House and the Senate maintained a similar 
focus.187 
 3.   In Pari Materia: Fifteenth Amendment Jurisprudence 
 That ambiguous legislative history is consistent with the state of 
Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence as it stood at the time of the 
Sixty-Sixth Congress. Congress modeled the Nineteenth Amendment 
after the Fifteenth, and the language of the two amendments is 
nearly identical.188 The identical language suggests that the two 
amendments should be interpreted in pari materia.189 Because 
                                                                                                                  
 183. See H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th Cong. (1919) (enacted at 41 Stat. 362 (1919)). 
 184. See H.R. REP. NO. 66-1 (1919). 
 185. See H.R. REP. NO. 65-234, pt. 2, at 2 (1918) (minority views); H.R. REP. NO. 65-219, 
pt. 2, at 2 (1917) (minority views); S. REP. NO. 64-35, at 2 (1916); S. REP. NO. 63-64, at 3 
(1913). 
 186. See, e.g., Woman Suffrage: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th 
Cong. 12 (1917) (testimony of Sen. John B. Kendrick); id. at 27-28 (testimony of Sen. 
Charles Spalding Thomas); id. at 31 (testimony of Sen. Reed Smoot); Woman Suffrage: 
Hearings Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pt. 4, 64th Cong. 161 (1916) 
(testimony of Rep. John E. Raker); Woman Suffrage: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pt. 1, 63d Cong. 11-12 (1914) (testimony of Rep. Frank W. Modell); 
id. at 83-84 (testimony of Rep. J. Thomas Heflin). 
 187. See, e.g., 58 CONG. REC. 619-20 (1919) (statement of Sen. Frank Brandegee); id. at 
88-89 (statement of Rep. Frank Clark). 
 188. The amendments are identical except for the replacement of the words “race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude” with the word “sex.” Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, 
with U.S. CONST. amend XV. 
 189. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789 (1999) (arguing 
that the phrase “the right of citizens of the United States to vote” in several constitutional 
amendments should be interpreted in pari materia with one another); Franita Tolson, 
Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. 1195, 1198 n.12 (2012) (arguing that the interpretation of the Elections Clause is 
informed by the interpretation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and vice 
versa); see also Fish, supra note 157, at 1171, 1177-78 (arguing that the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment’s Enforcement Clause should be read in pari materia with the identical 
enforcement clauses in other constitutional provisions).  
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Congress is presumed to be aware of the state of Fifteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence at the time it proposed the Nineteenth 
Amendment to the states,190 the handful of Fifteenth Amendment 
decisions decided as of 1919 is instructive in interpreting the 
Nineteenth Amendment. 
 First, in Neal v. Delaware, the Court held that the Fifteenth 
Amendment effectively excised the word “white” from all state voter 
qualifications, and did so automatically, without any necessary 
enforcement legislation from Congress.191 The Court found that states 
need not actually remove the offending language; so long as the 
states were not taking affirmative steps to enforce the 
unconstitutional requirement, the Court would not presume that the 
states were actually following their state constitution to the 
detriment of the Fifteenth Amendment.192 
 Next, in Elk v. Wilkins, the Court noted that the Fifteenth 
Amendment, by its terms, applied only to “citizen[s] of the United 
States.”193 Having ruled that a Native American voter was not a 
“citizen of the United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court found that the would-be voter was not entitled to the 
protections of the Fifteenth Amendment.194 
 Later, in James v. Bowman, the Court invalidated the indictment 
of a man prosecuted for bribing several black voters to refrain from 
voting.195 The Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment does not 
reach all improper election activity—like the bribery at issue  
here—simply because its victims were black; the unlawful conduct 
had to occur because of the race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude of the voters.196 
 Finally, in Guinn v. United States, the Court invalidated a state 
constitutional provision limiting suffrage only to those individuals 
who passed a literacy test, unless either the individual or his 
ancestor was eligible to vote prior to January 1, 1866 (i.e., before the 
                                                                                                                  
 190. Cf. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239-40 (2009) (“Congress is 
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to 
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” (quoting Lorillard v. 
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978))). 
 191. 103 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1880). 
 192. Id. at 391-93. The Court went on to hold, however, that the defendant made out a 
prima facie case that black voters had been excluded from this jury selection pool in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and overturned the conviction until the lower 
courts had heard evidence on that claim. Id. at 393-98. 
 193. See 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884). 
 194. Id. 
 195. 190 U.S. 127, 127-28 (1903). 
 196. Id. at 139.  
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adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).197 The Court 
held that although the so-called “grandfather clause” did not 
explicitly make race or color a condition of voting, the clause clearly 
had that effect: only white voters would be eligible to vote before the 
enactment of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and so only 
white voters or their (also white) descendants could vote under the 
challenged regime without passing the literacy test.198 The Court also 
held that because the only possible purpose of such a clause could be 
to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against discrimination in 
voting on the basis of race or color, the grandfather clause could not 
stand.199 
 To summarize,200 the Fifteenth Amendment (1) operated to 
automatically invalidate explicit race- or color-based voter 
qualifications; (2) protected only United States citizens and even then 
did not protect them from activity not motivated by race or color; and 
(3) reached non-explicit discrimination in voting on the basis of race 
or color, at least where the race- or color-based motivation was 
remarkably obvious. In short, the decisions did not deal with the sort 
of lesser restrictions prevalent today. 
 4.   Summarizing the Nineteenth Amendment’s Primary Purpose 
 Taken together, the legislative history of the Nineteenth 
Amendment combined with the state of Fifteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence support the conclusion that the Nineteenth 
Amendment was primarily concerned with striking the word “male” 
                                                                                                                  
 197. 238 U.S. 347, 354-58 (1915); see also Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 377-82 
(1915) (reaching an identical result concerning another state’s grandfather clause). 
 198. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 364-65.  
 199. Id. The Court also invalidated the literacy test, not because it also violated either 
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, but because the literacy test was so intertwined 
with the grandfather clause as part of the entire voter qualification regime that one part 
could not stand without the other. Id. at 365-67. 
 200. In addition to these four cases, this Article addresses cases concerning the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement authority, infra, Section IV.C. For an analysis of 
relevant lower court cases, see JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL 
HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 97-126 (1909). Two other pre-1919 Fifteenth 
Amendment cases in the Supreme Court shed only minimal light on the constitutional 
provision. In McPherson v. Blacker, the Supreme Court held, without substantial 
discussion, that a particular change in the way a state appointed its presidential electors 
did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1892). 
In Giles v. Harris and Giles v. Teasley, the Court held that it was powerless to decide a 
Fifteenth Amendment claim brought by a black voter against his local board of registrars 
for refusing to add him to the voter rolls on account of his race. Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 
146, 164 (1904) (“Giles II”); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903) (“Giles I”). Giles I and 
Giles II are mostly notable not for what they say about the Fifteenth Amendment, but for 
what they say historically about the Court’s willingness to fight the disenfranchisement of 
black voters in the South. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: 
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 96-107 (4th ed. 2012). 
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from those state laws that governed voter qualifications but shed 
little light on whether the Amendment itself—absent enforcement 
legislation—would combat lesser restrictions on voting that 
discriminated on account of sex.  
C.   The Enforcement Clause and Sex-Based Barriers to the Ballot 
 It is not surprising that debates in Congress centered on 
enfranchising women rather than potentially combating post-
enfranchisement hurdles women might face in order to vote. No one 
opposed woman suffrage out of a sex-based animus towards women 
in the way that many opposed black suffrage out of a race-based 
animus towards blacks.201 Even members opposed to woman suffrage 
grounded their opposition in a reverence for women.202 Congress 
hardly expected that, should three-quarters of the state legislatures 
ratify the Nineteenth Amendment, the states remaining opposed to 
woman suffrage would respond with state-sponsored restrictions 
that, while gender-neutral on their face, nonetheless cut more 
heavily against women than men—as states had done for decades 
with black voters.203 Although House Joint Resolution 1 included an 
enforcement clause identical to that found in other constitutional 
amendments, Congress had no reason to expect to have to use it. 
 Yet Congress was not entirely unaware of the prospect that 
women might face barriers even after a constitutional amendment 
granted women the franchise. One report of the Senate Committee on 
Woman Suffrage stated that “ballot box . . . regulations [should be] 
                                                                                                                  
 201. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement 
of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 732-43 (1998) (detailing the systematic 
efforts to prevent black voters from voting in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries). The debate over the Nineteenth Amendment put this racial animus on display. 
See 58 CONG. REC. 619 (1919) (statement of Sen. Ellison Smith) (expressing concern over 
the enfranchisement of black women, but not white women). Senator John Williams even 
proposed to amend the joint resolution so that it would read “[t]he right of white citizens to 
vote [shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of sex].” See id. at 557. 
 202. See, e.g., id. at 8830-31 (statement of Rep. William Lankford) (opposing the joint 
resolution but noting, “Without [women] our Nation would never have been established 
and without them our civilization would perish from the face of the earth. . . . Woman can 
never by the ballot become purer, sweeter, and nobler than she is. . . . I do not believe the 
ballot will degrade woman; I know that it can never make her better.”). 
 203. See Jon Greenbaum et al., Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes 
Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 816 (2014) (“For nearly 100 years [following the end of 
Reconstruction in 1876], many Southern states prevented most of their African American 
citizens from exercising their right to vote through laws and by force.”). This racial animus 
was even on display during the debates over the Nineteenth Amendment. See 58 CONG. 
REC. 563 (1919) (statement of Sen. John Williams) (“It is true [Mississippi] took advantage 
of the fact that we knew there would be nine Negroes [sic] to one white man disqualified for 
these reasons [educational requirements, poll taxes, felony disenfranchisement provisions, 
and registration requirements], but not one of them is a disqualification ‘on account of race, 
or color, or previous condition of servitude.’ They are on account of the disqualifications 
themselves.”). 
544  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:507 
 
designed to protect the voter and guarantee the freedom of 
elections”204 and explained that if women are entitled to vote, “her 
right is equivalent to that of man, and like man, she should have 
[that right] unhampered by any restriction that is not common to 
both.”205 Although these barriers were not Congress’s primary focus, 
the legislative history gives some clues about how the Sixty-Sixth 
Congress would view its power to address such barriers, if they did 
arise. 
 1.   Legislative History of the Enforcement Clause 
 First, Congress understood that the power conferred on the 
legislative branch by the Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement 
Clause was enormous. One member in the House noted that under 
the authority of the proposed amendment, states should soon expect 
to “find Federal supervisors and inspectors attending all our 
elections, and perhaps Federal appointees holding all our elections 
under this provision.”206 Another explained that the Enforcement 
Clause “gives to Congress the full, absolute, unrestricted, and 
exclusive power to ‘enforce this article,’ . . . ‘[b]y appropriate 
legislation.’ . . . [The Enforcement Clause] invests Congress with 
complete power to carry [the Amendment] into effect by the 
enactment of [appropriate] legislation . . . .”207 One Senator suggested 
that the Enforcement Clause would entitle Congress “to put [certain 
states] under Federal control as to elections.208 The minority views 
put forth in the report of the House Committee on Woman Suffrage 
argued against proposing the suffrage amendment to the states 
precisely because it would work a fundamental shift in the power 
over elections from the states to Congress.209 
 Even more important than the views of individual members, the 
entire Senate is on record concerning the enforcement power. Prior to 
final passage of the joint resolution, the Senate considered an 
amendment that would have re-written the Enforcement Clause to 
read, “[T]hat the several States shall have the authority to enforce 
this article by necessary legislation, but if any State shall enforce or 
enact any legislation in conflict therewith, then Congress shall not be 
                                                                                                                  
 204. S. REP. NO. 64-35, at 1 (1916). 
 205. Id. at 4. 
 206. 58 CONG. REC. 82 (1919) (statement of Rep. Rufus Hardy). He continued, “Even 
now, if and when Congress shall pass laws to enforce the [F]ifteenth and this proposed 
[A]mendment, the Federal Government will or may control not only all our elections for 
Federal offices, but every State, county, and municipal election.” Id. 
 207. Id. at 90 (statement of Rep. Frank Clark). 
 208. Id. at 563 (statement of Sen. William Borah). 
 209. See H.R. REP. NO. 66-1, pt. 2, at 1-3 (1919) (minority views). 
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excluded from enacting appropriate legislation to enforce it.”210 By 
rejecting the amendment by greater than a three-to-one margin, the 
Senate reaffirmed both (1) that Congress alone, not the states with a 
congressional backup, would be the constitutional entity charged 
with enforcing the Nineteenth Amendment and (2) that the more 
flexible adjective “appropriate,” rather than the stricter term 
“necessary,” was the relevant standard that enforcement legislation 
had to meet.211 Both chambers took similar action in the previous 
Congress as well: the Senate tabled a proposed amendment which 
would have removed the words “or by any State” from the text of the 
joint resolution; when a member proposed removing the enforcement 
clause from the joint resolution, the House took no action to overturn 
a point of order striking the proposal.212 
 Finally, after ratification, members of Congress proposed 
legislation pursuant to their enforcement power, suggesting how 
members of Congress who proposed the Nineteenth Amendment 
viewed the scope of their enforcement authority under the 
Amendment.213 True to the statements made in debate over the 
Nineteenth Amendment, the legislation assumed significant 
authority. Although each piece of legislation enforced requirements 
no broader than the literal terms of the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition, each did so by intruding not into elections for federal 
office, but into elections for the “State, Territory, district, county, 
city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other 
territorial subdivision.”214 Second, each piece of legislation essentially 
federalized state election administrators by making the legislation 
apply to 
every person who shall be required by law to assess, enroll, or 
register citizens of the United States or to perform any other duty 
in order that such citizens may be qualified to vote; and every 
person who shall be required by law to receive or count the ballots 
                                                                                                                  
 210. 58 CONG. REC. 634 (1919) (text of amendment proposed by Sen. Edward Gay). 
 211. See id. (recording a 19-62 vote to reject the amendment). 
 212. See 56 CONG. REC. 10,986-87 (1918) (showing a 50-33 vote in the Senate to table 
the amendment ); id. at 810 (showing that the House took no action to overturn the point of 
order). 
 213. See S. 4739, 66th Cong. (1920); H.R. 15018, 66th Cong. (1920); S. 4323, 66th Cong. 
(1920). Enacted legislation that implements the will of the entire Congress would obviously 
be more probative than introduced legislation that expresses only the wishes of its 
sponsors. However, because ratification came over a year after Congress proposed the 
suffrage amendment to the states, the Sixty-Sixth Congress did not have time to consider 
and pass Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation after ratification. Introduced-
but-not-enacted legislation is an incomplete but nonetheless probative substitute. 
 214. S. 4739 § 1; H.R. 15018 § 1; S. 4323 § 1. 
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of voters or to perform any other duty as an officer of any election 
or to certify the result of any election.215 
Third, the legislation backed up its requirements with both criminal 
sanctions and an authorization for courts to monitor compliance with 
the legislation: Congress authorized any state court to issue 
mandamus to bring state officials into compliance upon petition of 
any aggrieved citizen and authorized federal courts to issue similar 
writs of mandamus upon petition by the United States.216 Finally, the 
legislation would have outright repealed “[a]ll laws or parts of laws in 
conflict with this Act,” which would include not only state law 
provisions restricting voter qualifications to male voters but also 
state law provisions which might have hampered enforcement of the 
legislation.217 
 2.   In Pari Materia I: Lessons from Prohibition 
 The now-repealed Eighteenth Amendment contained an 
enforcement clause nearly identical to the Enforcement Clause in the 
Nineteenth Amendment, strongly suggesting that the two 
enforcement clauses be read in pari materia.218 The Eighteenth 
Amendment was proposed by the Congress immediately preceding 
the one that proposed the Nineteenth Amendment, and the two 
Congresses shared many of the same members.219 Additionally, the 
Sixty-Sixth Congress passed Eighteenth Amendment enforcement 
                                                                                                                  
 215. S. 4739 § 2; H.R. 15018 § 2; S. 4323 § 2. 
 216. S. 4739 §§ 3, 4; H.R. 15018 §§ 3, 4; S. 4323 §§ 3, 4. 
 217. S. 4739 § 5; H.R. 15018 § 5; S. 4323 § 5. The most obvious example of a law “in 
conflict with this Act” might be a state law restricting state courts’ authority to issue writs 
of mandamus, but one could imagine the provision applying to laws mandating that 
registration officials only receive applications for registration inside a males-only private 
membership club. 
This is not as far-fetched as it sounds. Although election administrators now generally 
have offices inside government buildings, this has not always been the case: when Susan B. 
Anthony illegally registered to vote in the 1872 federal election, she did so at a local barber 
shop because that was where the Board of Registry was then housed. See Winkler, supra 
note 134, at 1506. 
 218. The only difference is that the Eighteenth Amendment gave concurrent 
enforcement power to both the states and to Congress; the Nineteenth Amendment 
assigned enforcement authority to Congress alone. Compare U.S. CONST. amend XVIII, 
repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1, with U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. For arguments 
that similar constitutional provisions should be read in pari materia, see Amar, supra note 
189, at 789; Fish, supra note 157, at 1171, 1177-78; Tolson, supra note 189, at 1198 n.12. 
 219. See S.J. Res. 17, 65th Cong., 40 Stat. 1050 (1917) (proposing the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the states). Compare 58 CONG. REC. 3-4 (1919) (listing Senators of the 
Sixty-Sixth Congress), and id. at 5-7 (listing Representatives of the Sixty-Sixth Congress), 
with 55 CONG. REC. 101 (1917) (listing Senators of the Sixty-Fifth Congress), and id. at 
105-106 (listing Representatives of the Sixty-Fifth Congress). 
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legislation—the National Prohibition Act220—making the legislation 
an excellent case study for what the Sixty-Sixth Congress thought of 
the scope of its enforcement clause authority.221 
 The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited only “the manufacture, 
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation 
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all 
territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes.”222 
Congress, however, enacted a significantly broader statutory 
prohibition. First, Congress regulated not only the commercial 
activities prohibited by the Eighteenth Amendment but also other 
activities not within the Amendment’s ambit: simple possession and 
non-commercial bartering involving liquor, fraud involving the 
shipment of liquor, advertising involving liquor, possession or use of 
the means for manufacturing liquor (whether or not actually used for 
that purposes).223 Second, Congress applied the prohibition not only 
to intoxicating liquors prohibited by the Eighteenth Amendment but 
to non-intoxicating liquors, and it imposed a strict regulatory regime 
on alcohol not used for beverage purposes.224 Third, Congress 
provided for the investigation and prosecution of violations in federal 
court.225 Finally, Congress created a private right of action against 
persons who helped an intoxicated person procure liquor, if that 
intoxicated person harmed the plaintiff in some way as a result of 
being intoxicated.226 
 The reports of each chamber’s respective Committee on the 
Judiciary explain the scope of Congress’s enforcement clause 
authority and why the National Prohibition Act constituted 
“appropriate legislation” under that clause.227 In the House, the 
Committee on the Judiciary explained that courts must uphold 
legislation passed under the Enforcement Clause unless “Congress 
could have no reason to believe that its provisions are either 
                                                                                                                  
 220. Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305, 305 (1919) (repealed 1935) (commonly known as 
the “Volstead Act”). 
 221. Cf. Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 379, 422-25 (2014) (arguing that the interpretation of constitutional 
amendments is informed by analyzing legislation enacted (1) pursuant to the constitutional 
authority granted by those amendments and (2) shortly after the ratification of those 
amendments). 
 222. U.S. CONST. amend XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 1. 
 223. §§ 3, 10-19, 41 Stat. at 308, 312-13. 
 224. See id. § 1, at 307-08 (defining “liquor” and “intoxicating liquor” as having greater 
than 0.5% alcohol whether or not actually intoxicating); id. §§ 4-13, at 309-12 (creating the 
regulatory regime). 
 225. Id. §§ 1-9, at 305-11. 
 226. Id. § 20, at 313. 
 227. H.R. REP. NO. 66-91, at 4 (1919); S. REP. NO. 66-151, at 12 (1919). 
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necessary or appropriate for carrying such power into execution”228 
and specifically cited recent Supreme Court cases upholding 
congressional legislation if that legislation had “any reasonable 
relation to the object sought.”229 In the Senate, the Committee on the 
Judiciary explained that Congress’s power under the Enforcement 
Clause “carries with it the power to enact any law having a 
reasonable relation to the end sought by the original authorized act” 
and specifically stated that “[t]he purpose of the legislation and 
difficulties attendant upon its enforcement are vital factors in 
determining what is appropriate legislation, such as authorized by 
the [Enforcement Clause].”230 
 After enactment, the Supreme Court upheld a variety of these 
provisions.231 In contrast to today’s Court, which frequently limits the 
scope of legislation in order to avoid potential constitutional 
difficulties,232 the Court had no problem interpreting the National 
Prohibition Act broadly to effectuate its purpose.233 Most importantly, 
the Court upheld Congress’s view as to the standard governing 
review of legislation passed pursuant to the Enforcement Clause: 
[W]here the means adopted by Congress are not prohibited and are 
calculated to effect the object intrusted [sic] to it, this Court may 
not inquire into the degree of their necessity; as this would be to 
pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department and to 
tread upon legislative ground. Nor may it enquire [sic] as to the 
wisdom of the legislation. What it may consider is whether that 
which has been done by Congress has gone beyond the 
constitutional limits upon its legislative discretion. 
                                                                                                                  
 228. H.R. REP. NO. 66-91, at 4. The Committee also asserted Congress’s “right to define 
the power conferred upon it by the Constitution.” Id.  
 229. Id. at 6. 
 230. S. REP. NO. 66-151, at 12 (1919); see also id. (citing Supreme Court cases to this 
effect). 
 231. See Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 387-88 (1920) (“While recognizing that 
there are limits beyond which Congress cannot go in treating beverages as within its power 
of enforcement, we think those limits are not transcended by the [broad definition of 
‘liquor’].”); accord Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U.S. 403, 408-09 (1922) (reaching an 
identical conclusion concerning an identical state law). 
 232. See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the 
Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 192-95 (2009). Notably, this is particularly common 
in the voting rights context. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21-23 (2009) 
(interpreting section 2 of the Voting Rights Act narrowly in order to avoid a constitutional 
question); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (interpreting section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act narrowly in order to avoid a constitutional question), superceded 
by statute, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, sec. 5(3), § 5(c), 120 
Stat. 577, 580-81 (codified as amended 52 U.S.C. § 10304(c) (Supp. II 2014)). 
 233. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 126-29 (1923); Grogan v. Hiram 
Walker & Sons, Ltd., 259 U.S. 80, 89-90 (1922); Corneli v. Moore, 257 U.S. 491, 496 (1922). 
But see United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 363-64 (1926). 
2016]  NINETEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT 549 
 
  It is clear that Congress, under its express power to enforce 
by appropriate legislation the prohibition of traffic in intoxicating 
liquors for beverage purposes, may adopt any eligible and 
appropriate means to make that prohibition effective. The possible 
abuse of a power is not an argument against its existence.234 
 In short, the Sixty-Sixth Congress believed that (1) it had nearly 
plenary authority under the Eighteenth Amendment Enforcement 
Clause and that (2) its enforcement legislation was entitled to 
substantial deference from the judiciary. Later, the United States 
Supreme Court agreed on both counts. The Sixty-Sixth Congress 
likely intended to vest itself with similar authority and similar 
discretion under the Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause. 
 3.   In Pari Materia II: Lessons from Fifteenth Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
 Although scholars sometimes characterize the early Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement clause jurisprudence as “play[ing] a pivotal 
role in invalidating national efforts to insure [sic] full citizenship to 
black citizens” and characterize the decisions as having “struck down 
and eviscerated various federal protections of black voting rights,”235 
it is not clear that such a characterization is warranted. 
 It is true that the cases struck down much of Congress’s early 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. In United States v. 
Reese, the Court invalidated an enforcement statute as overbroad, 
because it penalized an election official for improperly refusing to 
allow a black voter to cast a ballot without requiring that official 
action be taken on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.236 However, the Court also held that Congress may protect 
rights emanating from the Constitution, like the Fifteenth 
Amendment right against racial discrimination in voting—the 
implication being that a statute with a hook into race or color would 
withstand judicial scrutiny.237 
                                                                                                                  
 234. James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559-60 (1924) (internal citations 
omitted); accord Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 593-97 (1926) (relying on James 
Everard’s Breweries to reach an identical result); Selzman v. United States, 268 U.S. 466, 
468-69 (1925) (“The power of the [f]ederal [g]overnment, granted by the Eighteenth 
Amendment . . . carries with it power to enact any legislative measures reasonably adapted 
to promote the [Eighteenth Amendment’s] purpose.”). 
 235. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 200, at 97. 
 236. 92 U.S. 214, 219-22 (1875). 
 237. Id. at 217-18; see also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903) (invalidating an 
indictment against a man for bribing several black voters to refrain from voting on the 
ground that the indictment did not actually allege that the defendant bribed the black 
voters on account of their race or color). 
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 A similar case, United States v. Cruikshank, arose out of a 
criminal prosecution of over a hundred individuals involved in the 
Colfax Massacre for their violent attempt to prevent black voters 
from casting ballots.238 The Court held that while voting was not a 
right guaranteed by the Constitution (citing Minor v. Happersett), the 
right against race- or color-based discrimination in voting was 
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment and thus under Reese 
constituted a proper subject of congressional enforcement 
legislation.239 The Court nonetheless struck the indictment because 
although the Justices “may [have] suspect[ed] that race was the 
cause of the hostility[,] . . . it [wa]s not so averred” in the indictment 
and thus lacked the necessary Fifteenth Amendment connection.240 
 The tide began to turn in Ex Parte Yarbrough, in which several 
individuals challenged their criminal convictions for violently 
attacking a black voter to prevent him from voting in a federal 
election.241 Distinguishing its earlier opinions in both Minor and 
Reese, the Court found that (1) not only was the right to vote free 
from race- or color-based discrimination a right protected by the 
Constitution which Congress had the power to protect but that (2) in 
operation, the Fifteenth Amendment might combine with the 
remaining non-discriminatory provisions of state law to affirmatively 
grant an individual the right to vote and that Congress could protect 
that right as well.242 The Court explained: 
  While it is quite true . . . that [the Fifteenth Amendment] gives 
no affirmative right to the colored [sic] man to vote, . . . it is easy to 
see that under some circumstances it may operate as the immediate 
source of a right to vote. In all cases where . . . the words ‘white man’ 
[exist] as a qualification for voting, [the Fifteenth Amendment] did, 
in effect, confer on him the right to vote, because, . . . it annulled the 
discriminating word white, and thus left him in the enjoyment of the 
same right as white persons. . . . In such cases this fifteenth article 
of amendment does, proprio vigore, substantially confer on the 
negro [sic] the right to vote, and Congress has the power to protect 
and enforce that right.243 
                                                                                                                  
 238. 92 U.S. 542, 544-46 (1875); id. at 560 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (mentioning the 
number of individuals involved at each stage of the litigation); ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra 
note 200, at 97 (noting the case’s connection with the Colfax Massacre). 
 239. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551-56; see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637 
(1883) (holding that a criminal statute could not be sustained under the Fifteenth 
Amendment, because there was no connection to the right to vote free from discrimination 
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude). 
 240. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556; see also Harris, 106 U.S. at 637.  
 241. 110 U.S. 651, 652-57 (1884). 
 242. Id. at 664-67 (distinguishing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874), 
and United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)). 
 243. Id. at 665 (citation omitted). 
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 No case held that enforcement legislation had to be coextensive 
with the prohibition contained in the Fifteenth Amendment itself—
meaning no decision held that enforcement legislation was limited to 
determining the venue for cases charging violations of the 
Amendment, or to setting the penalties for Amendment violations.244 
The cases merely required some connection, some hook, into race- or 
color-based discrimination. The Sixty-Sixth Congress understood 
this; it believed that its power to draft enforcement legislation was 
broad and that it had discretion to construct long chains connecting 
enforcement legislation to the constitutional prohibition.245 
 4.   The Scope of Congress’s Enforcement Clause Authority 
 The legislative history of the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
Enforcement Clause, the enactment of Eighteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation, and the state of then-existing Fifteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence all shed light on the scope of 
congressional power under the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
Enforcement Clause. All three of these sources of law support the 
conclusion that the Sixty-Sixth Congress would have (1) thought it 
had extraordinary power to combat the voting restrictions that 
proliferate today and (2) expected that courts would substantially 
defer to Congress’s determination about the appropriateness of its 
enforcement legislation.246 
                                                                                                                  
 244. See, e.g., James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 136-39 (1903) (holding that enforcement 
legislation cannot attack activity by non-governmental actors). 
 245. The Bowman Court also held that enforcement legislation could not attack non-
governmental activity. See id. Voting rights advocates have identified some private groups 
as being threats to the franchise. See generally LIZ KENNEDY ET AL., DEMOS & COMMON 
CAUSE, BULLIES AT THE BALLOT BOX: PROTECTING THE FREEDOM TO VOTE AGAINST 
WRONGFUL CHALLENGES AND INTIMIDATION (2012), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications/BulliesAtTheBallotBox-Final.pdf. However, these groups are nowhere 
near equivalent to the violent Ku Klux Klan of the late 1800s. Additionally, none of the 
threats to voting identified in Part II of this Article are private actions. Accordingly, this 
Article need not articulate a position on whether Congress adopted Bowman’s “state 
action” limitation into the Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause. See Bowman, 
190 U.S. at 136-39. 
 246. Contemporanous legal scholarship generally concurred that the Nineteenth 
Amendment represented a substantial increase in Congress’s power over elections. See 
Emmet O’Neal, The Susan B. Anthony Amendment. Effect of Its Ratification on the Rights 
of the States to Regulate and Control Suffrage and Elections, 6 VA. L. REV. 338, 355 (1920); 
cf. Charles Hall Davis, Note, Shall Virginia Ratify the Federal Suffrage Amendment?, 5 VA. 
L. REG. 354, 363 (1919); Raeburn Green, Book Review, 30 HARV. L. REV. 406, 406-07 (1917) 
(reviewing HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, WOMAN’S SUFFRAGE BY CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT (1916)). 
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D.   Types of Restrictions the Sixty-Sixth Congress Might Target 
  The breadth of Congress’s enforcement power, however, provides 
little insight into what types of restrictions the Sixty-Sixth Congress 
might have targeted, if it could have foreseen them. Although the 
legislative history on this matter is sparse—again, because Congress 
did not expect states to resist the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
mandate—the legislative history suggests Congress would have 
viewed several of the restrictions identified in Part II as onerous 
enough to warrant a legislative response. 
 1.   Partisan and Ideological Motivations 
 One unsurprising concern motivating Congress was the political 
fortunes of individual members and their allies. Both Democrats and 
Republicans hoped to benefit electorally from the votes of newly 
enfranchised women. One member in the House spoke at length 
about the women elected to office on the strength of women voters in 
suffrage states.247 Another boldly predicted that newly enfranchised 
women would side with one party over the other.248 A third 
proclaimed, “No party in the future which hopes to win will ever 
name a man for President who opposes [woman suffrage].”249 In the 
Senate, two senators predicted that enforcement legislation would be 
forthcoming specifically because of the political effects of ensuring 
women’s right to vote.250 Debate over the joint resolution in the Sixty-
Fifth Congress also stressed the electoral benefits of enfranchising 
women.251 
 In a prior Congress, the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage 
heard testimony that Congress could expect “women will take sides 
in party affairs, just as men do, and align themselves with one 
[political] organization or another.”252 The Committee heard 
testimony that some women had, in fact, already aligned with one 
party or another and that their tactics were having an effect on 
                                                                                                                  
 247. See 58 CONG. REC. 87 (1919) (statement of Rep. William Vaile). 
 248. See id. at 91 (statement of Rep. Frank Clark). 
 249. See id. at 8834 (1919) (statement of Rep. Rufus Hardy). 
 250. See id. at 564 (statement of Sen. William Borah); id. at 627 (statement of Sen. 
James Reed).  
 251. See 56 CONG. REC. 764 (1918) (statement of Rep. James Cantrill) (explaining that 
he planned to vote for the joint resolution because women’s votes had voted for members of 
his party in the 1916 election); id. at 10,979 (statement of Sen. Irvine Lenroot) (arguing 
that enfranchising women will help members of one particular party). 
 252. See Woman Suffrage: Hearing on S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman 
Suffrage, 65th Cong. 14 (1917) (testimony of Sen. John B. Kendrick). The Senator’s 
testimony also made clear that he believed women would “put principle above partizanship 
[sic] and patriotism above patronage.” Id. 
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election results.253 The Committee also heard testimony that other 
women were politically independent and that their votes were up for 
grabs.254 The House Committee on Woman Suffrage and its 
Committee on the Judiciary heard similar testimony concerning the 
political availability of women’s votes.255 One witness even testified 
that “[m]ore than 8,000,000 women will vote in the presidential 
election in 1920 and there can not [sic] be any doubt . . . that the 
present party in power has everything to gain and nothing to lose in 
putting [the woman suffrage amendment] through before the 1918 
elections.”256 
 Even where members did not speak of the advantage to be gained 
by an expanded electorate explicitly in terms of partisanship, 
members nonetheless spoke in positive terms of the effects women 
voters would have on election results. One report of the House 
Committee on Woman Suffrage explained that women’s “influence 
upon politics and society in general has been a positive and not a 
negative force” and specifically stated that women-as-voters have 
“strengthen[ed] the demand for good laws governing home conditions 
and care of children.”257 A member in the House, from a suffrage 
state, explained that when women voted and campaigned for a 
particular issue, it was “usually of an improving and reformatory 
character.”258 The Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage heard 
testimony that allowing women to vote was necessary in order 
protect certain types of desirable laws.259 A Senator from a suffrage 
state argued before that Committee that “in the last few years, 
through [women’s] vote and influence, [the Senator’s state] has 
                                                                                                                  
 253. See id. at 29 (testimony of Sen. John B. Kendrick); id. at 47 (testimony of Rheta 
Childe Dorr); Woman Suffrage: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. 
on Woman Suffrage, 64th Cong. 66 (1916) (testimony of A.J. George, Exec. Sec’y of the 
Cong. Comm., Nat’l Ass’n Opposed to Woman Suffrage). 
 254. See Woman Suffrage: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before the S. Comm. on Woman 
Suffrage, 63d Cong. 44 (1918) (statement of Rep. Burton L. French); id. at 84 (testimony of 
Helen H. Gardener). 
 255. See Extending the Right of Suffrage to Women: Hearings on H.J. Res. 200, Before 
the H. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 51 (1918) (testimony of Maude Wood Park) 
(pointing out that both major parties have devoted substantial resources to recruiting 
women voters in the suffrage states); Woman Suffrage: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pts. 2 & 3, 64th Cong. 48 (1916) (testimony of Helen Todd) 
(arguing that newly enfranchised women would reward with votes the party which 
proposed the suffrage amendment). 
 256. Woman Suffrage: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, 
pt. 5, 65th Cong. 184-85 (1917) (testimony of Anne Martin, Chairman Nat’l Woman’s 
Party). 
 257. H.R. REP. NO. 65-234, at 2 (1918). 
 258. 58 CONG. REC. 8832 (1919) (statement of Rep. Henry Osborne). 
 259. See Woman Suffrage: Hearing on S.J. Res. 2  Before the S. Comm. on Woman 
Suffrage, 65th Cong. 51 (1917) (testimony of Madeline Z. Doty, Correspondent of the New 
York Tribune). 
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secured more progressive and more humane legislation . . . . This, I 
am sure, has been largely because women have decided to take these 
things into their own hands and to reckon with them.”260 In written 
testimony submitted at one hearing of the House Committee on 
Woman Suffrage, a witness argued that a host of legislative 
achievements in one state was due, in part, to the grant of suffrage to 
women some years earlier.261 Essentially, these members argued that 
Congress must enfranchise women so that women can vote for 
candidates with whom the members agreed and so that those 
candidates can pass legislation that matches the members’ 
ideological perspective—partisanship by another name. 
 In other words, Congress was not merely trying to enfranchise 
women in theory and then move on to other matters. Rather, it was 
deeply in members’ political interest to see that women actually 
registered, actually voted, and that their votes actually counted. If 
modern-day barriers to the ballot would impede women’s ability to 
vote, especially where there was evidence that those restrictions were 
at least partly motivated by opposition to the choices women voters 
were making at the ballot box, the Sixty-Sixth Congress would have 
felt justified in using its enforcement power to tear down the 
obstacles to voting women faced. 
 2.   War Effort and Women as Full Members of Society 
 Political concerns were not members’ only interest. One commonly 
mentioned reason for members who supported the joint resolution 
was that women had earned the vote through their activities in 
support of the nation’s war effort in World War I.262 Although women 
did not fight, they did provide vital support efforts. One member in 
the House expressed support for women’s “service to the nation in 
times of both peace and war” and explained that “[t]he magnificent, 
efficient, and patriotic stand taken by the women of the United 
States during the Great War has proven” women’s entitlement to 
suffrage.263 Another member explained that society must grant 
women the vote, especially after it “praised [women] in every activity 
                                                                                                                  
 260. Id. at 13 (testimony of Sen. John B. Kendrick). 
 261. See Extending the Right of Suffrage to Women: Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 200 Before 
the H. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 327 (1918) (reprinting Seward A. Simons, A 
Survey of the Results of Woman Suffrage in California (1917)). 
 262. See Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to 
Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1352-53 (2003). 
 263. 58 CONG. REC. 8829 (1919) (statement of Rep. James C. Cantrill). 
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connected with the Great War. From the hospital to the firing line[,] 
every work of mercy and healing has been woman’s.”264 A third 
member argued on the House floor: 
  In the work of the Red Cross—the great mother of the 
world—in the hospitals and trenches on the battle fields of 
Flanders and France, and in all the tasks that lie at the very heart 
of civilization, women have displayed a patriotism and heroism 
born of devotion, sacrifice, and service . . . .265 
 Prior Congresses shared that sentiment. In the Sixty-Fifth 
Congress, Senators also defended woman suffrage as something 
women earned through their war effort, or even that woman suffrage 
was necessary for the proper prosecution of the war.266 A report  
of the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage noted, “She  
has . . . manufactured his ammunition, . . . operated his machines, 
bound up his wounds, buried his dead, and has been his comrade in 
arms upon the firing line.”267 A report of the House Committee on 
Woman Suffrage similarly remarked, “[T]he services of the women in 
the munition factories, the railways, the shipyards, the offices of 
administration, have first amazed men and then filled them with 
admiration and gratitude.”268 Committee hearings were practically 
overwhelmed with testimony concerning the contributions of women 
                                                                                                                  
 264. Id. at 8834 (statement of Rep. Rufus Hardy). Earlier in his speech, the same 
member asked, “[I]f the man bears the musket and the woman bears and nurses the man, 
whose burden is the heavier?” Id. at 8833; accord 57 CONG. REC. 3055-56 (1919) (statement 
of Sen. William Calder) (noting women’s service as nurses on the front lines); id. at 3061 
(statement of Sen. Gay) (arguing that women’s service in war justifies the extension of 
suffrage to women). 
 265. 58 CONG. REC. 83 (1919) (statement of Rep. Adolphus Nelson); see also id. at 84 
(statement of Rep. John MacCrate) (“Everywhere you went during the past two years you 
saw women in uniform. You saw them in the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, the Knights 
of Columbus, the Young Men’s Christian Association, Young Men’s Hebrew Association, 
and other allied war activities. . . . [T]he women who maintained equal industrial and 
agricultural burdens and high moral burdens to win the war are entitled to the 
franchise.”). 
 266. See 56 CONG. REC. 10,977 (1918) (statement of Sen. Albert Cummins); id. at 
10,979 (statement of Sen. Irvine Lenroot). 
 267. S. REP. NO. 64-35, at 2 (1916). The report continued, “Man has become conscious of 
her powerful cooperation in war; he will soon recognize the justice of her demand to share 
his burden in public affairs in times of peace.” Id. at 2-3. 
 268. H.R. REP. NO. 65-234, at 2 (1918). 
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to the war effort.269 Even the President, Woodrow Wilson, spoke 
directly on the Senate floor, arguing that woman suffrage was 
necessary as a war measure.270 
 Beyond women’s efforts to support the United States in wartime, 
members were recognizing that women were becoming members of 
society in their own right and therefore deserved the ballot. One 
member in the House responded to arguments that women’s place 
was in the home, not the polling place, by asking, “[H]ow about 
woman [sic] in the public-school room? How about woman [sic] in the 
Sunday-school room? How about woman [sic] in the Red Cross? How 
about woman [sic] in the Salvation Army? Are they not proper 
activities for our mothers, wives, and daughters?”271 Another member 
explained women’s new role in society: “I can remember . . . when our 
women rarely left home except to go to church. That time is past.”272 
A member from a suffrage state discussed women elected to office in 
his state: some had been school teachers, one had been a real estate 
developer, another a journalist, and yet another a physician; all, the 
member said, were a boon to the lawmaking process.273 
 Congress was proud of women’s new role in society—especially, 
but not limited to, women’s role in the war effort—and sought to 
reward them with the franchise. Having granted them the vote, 
Congress did not expect that states would enact voting restrictions 
that would burden women precisely because of the new 
responsibilities that women had undertaken—that is, Congress 
would not have wanted women to have to choose between making 
time to navigate hurdles to voting on the one hand and making time 
to fulfill their responsibilities in society on the other hand. To the 
extent that restrictions on voting required women to make such a 
choice, the Sixty-Sixth Congress would have felt justified in enacting 
enforcement legislation to break down those barriers. 
                                                                                                                  
 269. See, e.g., Extending the Right of Suffrage to Women: Hearings on H.J. Res. 200 
Before the H. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 235-36 (1918) (testimony of Maud 
Wood Park, Cong. Chairman, Nat’l Am. Woman Suffrage Ass’n); id. at 165-67 (testimony of 
Maud Younger); Woman Suffrage: Hearing on S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman 
Suffrage, 65th Cong. 40-45 (1917) (testimony of Mary Ritter Beard, Member, Nat’l 
Advisory Council of Woman’s Party Last Year); id. at 36-37 (testimony of Carrie Chapman 
Catt). 
 270. See 56 CONG. REC. 10,928-29 (1918), reprinted in S. DOC. 65-284 (1918). 
 271. 58 CONG. REC. 8832 (1919) (statement of Rep. Israel Foster). 
 272. Id. at 8834 (statement of Rep. Rufus Hardy). 
 273. See id. at 87 (statement of Rep. William Vaile). 
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 3.   Women as Caretakers 
 Though Congress certainly respected and hoped to encourage 
women’s new role in society, Congress also respected women’s more 
traditional role as mothers and as caretakers of children274 and cited 
that role as another reason for enfranchising women. 
 One member in the House specifically praised women because 
“she nurses her own little children.”275 Another member from a 
suffrage state justified his support for woman suffrage by stating 
that in his state, “it is not unusual to see a young matron wheel a 
baby carriage to the polling place and leave it in a shady place 
outside while she goes in to vote” and suggesting that this had a 
positive effect on the voting process itself.276 Yet another argued that 
mothers, in particular, had earned the vote by bearing the dangers of 
childbirth, just as male soldiers earned the vote by facing the dangers 
of the battlefield.277 
 In the debate in the Sixty-Fifth Congress, one Senator argued that 
if mothers could vote and were more involved in politics, it would 
better enable them to train their children in civic responsibility.278 
Another Senator asked rhetorically, “Who shall deny the privilege to 
his mother to participate in the affairs of government?”279  
 Committee reports from earlier Congresses also defended suffrage 
as a right mothers qua mothers had earned. In 1918, the House 
Committee on Woman Suffrage observed that in suffrage states, “by 
strengthening the demand for good laws governing home conditions 
and care of children, mothers have been enabled to do their work in 
the world to better effect.”280 The 1913 report of the Senate 
Committee on Woman Suffrage incorporated a letter from woman 
suffrage advocates, which stated:  
We desire these rights in order to raise in dignity and power the 
mothers of this Nation . . . and the welfare of this Nation is not 
promoted by denying to the mothers of the nation the elemental 
right of suffrage which is essential, not only to protect their own 
                                                                                                                  
 274. Modern law mirrors the Sixty-Sixth Congress’s concern for the wellbeing of 
children. See, e.g., Melanie Kalmanson, Giving the Pawns a Voice: A Call for Mandatory 
Representation of Children in High-Conflict Custody Battles, 5 THURGOOD MARSHALL SCH. 
L.J. ON GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 54, 57 (2015) (discussing the “best interests of the child” 
principle of family law in the child custody context). 
 275. Id. at 8834 (statement of Rep. Rufus Hardy). 
 276. Id. at 8832 (statement of Rep. Henry Osborne). 
 277. See id. at 79-80 (statement of Rep. Edward Little). 
 278. See 56 CONG. REC. 10,785 (1918) (statement of Sen. Kenneth McKellar). 
 279. See id. at 10,945 (statement of Sen. James Phelan).  
 280. H.R. Rep. No. 65-234, at 2 (1918). 
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rights of life, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness, but to 
protect their children, whom they have so loved, from the 
treacherous pitfalls that line the pathway of life.281 
 Members heard extensive testimony concerning the contributions 
of mothers to society. At a hearing before a Senate committee, one 
witness testified that, were it not for mothers caring for America’s 
soldiers, the nation would never have succeeded in its military 
battles.282 Another argued that the poor economic conditions in 
Germany were partially attributable to the fact that mothers had to 
work in munitions factories for substandard wages and did not earn 
enough money to afford proper nutrition for their children; the 
witness argued that access to the ballot would enable these women to 
improve these conditions through law.283 A witness from a suffrage 
state testified, “[Women’s] education as housekeepers, home makers, 
and mothers has proved a valuable contribution in voting on 
questions of public welfare.”284 In a hearing before a House 
committee, one woman relayed the powerful story of a nurse in a 
hospital on the front lines: “[D]uring the daytime the wounded were 
so cheerful, so brave, so gay, and so debonair, there was not a word of 
complaint, but during the long watches of the night, when self-
restraint was gone, she had learned one word in seven different 
languages, and that word was ‘Mother.’ ”285 Tellingly, a letter from 
the mother of six children inserted into the record of one hearing 
stated that while she desired suffrage, her duties as a caregiver for 
her children left her no time to help campaign for women’s right to 
vote.286 Several witnesses testified that voting was necessary because 
women might influence the laws to create better conditions for 
childcare.287 
 Even as it embraced the new role of women in society, Congress 
hoped to protect mothers and their role as caregivers to their 
                                                                                                                  
 281. S. REP. NO. 63-64, at 8 (1913). 
 282. See Woman Suffrage: Hearing on S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman 
Suffrage, 65th Cong. 40-45 (1917) (testimony of Mary Ritter Beard, Member, Nat’l 
Advisory Council of Woman’s Party Last Year). 
 283. Id. at 50-51 (testimony of Madeline Z. Doty, Correspondent of the New York 
Tribune). 
 284. Woman Suffrage: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before the S. Comm. on Woman 
Suffrage, 63d Cong. 72 (1913) (testimony of Elizabeth Kent). 
 285. Extending the Right of Suffrage to Women: Hearings on H.J. Res. 200 Before the H. 
Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 26 (1918) (testimony of Mrs. Henry Ware Allen 
(witness’s name not given)). 
 286. Id. at 100 (letter from Mrs. H.C. Davis). 
 287. See Woman Suffrage: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 
11, pt. 5, 65th Cong. 178-79 (1917) (testimony of Mrs. Donald R. Hooker); Woman Suffrage: 
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pt. 2, 64th Cong. 23 (1915) 
(testimony of Mrs. Harriet Stokes Thompson). 
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children. Had Congress foreseen that ostensibly gender-neutral 
restrictions on voting would disproportionately fall on mothers with 
childcare responsibilities, Congress would undoubtedly have opposed 
such restrictions and felt justified using its enforcement power to 
ensure women did not have to choose between childcare on one hand 
and access to the ballot on the other. 
E.   Summarizing the Contemporary Understanding  
of the Nineteenth Amendment 
 Students of the legislative history of the Nineteenth Amendment 
can draw three conclusions. First, the Sixty-Sixth Congress did not 
expect states to put up barriers in an attempt to prevent women from 
voting after ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. Second, if the 
Sixty-Sixth Congress had foreseen the barriers in place today, it 
would have been particularly concerned about the barriers that keep 
women from voting for political reasons, the barriers that make 
voting increasingly difficult for women who choose to work outside 
the home instead of assuming a role that revolves around the home, 
and the barriers that make it harder for women with childcare 
responsibilities to vote. Finally, the Sixty-Sixth Congress viewed its 
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power to be extremely broad 
and expected that Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation 
would receive extraordinary deference from the judiciary.  
V.   NINETEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION  
TO COMBAT TODAY’S RESTRICTIONS ON VOTING 
 Faced with increasingly restrictive voting laws and procedures yet 
having such broad power to enforce voting rights against restrictions 
that discriminate on account of sex, what should Congress do with its 
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement authority? If Congress did pass 
legislation, would courts uphold the exercise of its authority? 
A.   The Appropriate Standard of Review 
 Although the Sixty-Sixth Congress expected that its broad 
authority to enact Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation 
would be subject to judicial review only under a rational relationship 
test,288 the modern Court has invented the more demanding 
“congruence and proportionality” test to review Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                  
 288. See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end 
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”) (emphasis added) 
(demonstrating the great deference Congress receives under the rational relationship test).  
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Amendment enforcement legislation.289 While it is not clear if the 
Court would ignore the wishes of the Sixty-Sixth Congress and apply 
the congruence-and-proportionality test to enforcement legislation 
enacted under the Nineteenth Amendment,290 the following analysis 
shows how Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation meets 
even this more demanding test. 
 1.   The Right at Issue: The Right to Vote Free from Discrimination 
on Account of Sex 
 The initial inquiry in a congruence-and-proportionality analysis is 
to determine the scope of the right Congress seeks to enforce with its 
prophylactic legislation.291 For the Nineteenth Amendment, that 
right is phrased in the negative: “The right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or 
by any State on account of sex.”292 
 As previously discussed,293 the primary thrust of the Nineteenth 
Amendment was to excise the word “male” from state voter 
qualifications, although it also applied to non-explicit discrimination 
in voting on account of sex where the discrimination was obvious.  
 Modern day Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence has expanded 
that reach to all intentional discrimination in voting on account of 
race or color (whether or not the discrimination was as unusually 
obvious as in Guinn v. United States).294 Actions that may have the 
effect of denying the right to vote on the basis of race or color are 
therefore consistent with the Fifteenth Amendment if they lack a 
discriminatory purpose. 
                                                                                                                  
 289. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end.”). 
 290. The standard is not even clear for the Fifteenth Amendment’s Enforcement 
Clause, which has received a great deal of recent judicial attention. See Nw. Austin Mun. 
Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009) (refusing to decide whether the 
standard for review of Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation is congruence and 
proportionality or rational means); see also Richard Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of 
Boerne and the Future Jurisprudence of Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 
2013, 7:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/the-curious-disappearance-of-boerne-
and-the-future-jurisprudence-of-voting-rights-and-race (observing that the Court failed to 
address an open question about the proper standard of judicial review for Congress’s 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power). 
 291. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333-34 (2012); 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004) (citing Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356, 365 (2001)). 
 292. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1. 
 293. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
 294. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-65 (1980), superseded as to the 
statutory holding, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (Supp. II 2014)); see also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 
347, 363-64 (1915).  
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 The following analysis will assume the Nineteenth Amendment 
follows suit, such that the right at issue, at least in part, is the right 
to vote free from intentional discrimination based on sex. However, 
its legislative history also shows that the Nineteenth Amendment 
targets more than intentional discrimination. As discussed earlier, 
the Sixty-Sixth Congress would also have been concerned about 
restrictions affecting women that are politically motivated, 
restrictions that burden women who take an active role outside the 
home, and restrictions that burden women on account of their 
childcare responsibilities295—whether or not the restrictions 
intentionally target women. 
 2.   The Legislative Record: A “History and Pattern”296 of 
Constitutional Violations 
 After determining the right at issue, the next step is to inquire 
whether Congress had evidence of a pattern of constitutional 
violations.297 But not all evidence is created equal:298 courts will not 
uphold a congressional infringement on state sovereignty unless 
there is a certain quality and quantity of evidence.  
 First, the evidence must detail a pattern of actual, specific 
violations of the Constitution which Congress sought to remedy or 
prevent.299 Evidence of wrongful conduct is not directly probative if 
that wrongful conduct does not actually violate the Constitution.300 
Further, the evidence must be relatively recent at the time of the 
enactment.301 Additionally, Congress must collect more than a token 
                                                                                                                  
 295. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-65 (1980), superseded as to the 
statutory holding, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (Supp. II 2014)); see also Guinn, 238 U.S. at 363-64; supra 
Section IV.D (reviewing Congress’s concerns over these three items). 
 296. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001). 
 297. See supra Section IV.D. 
 298. But see THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . .”). 
 299. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004) (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365); 
see also Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1334 (2012) (“The evidence 
did not suggest States had facially discriminatory self-care leave policies or that they 
administered neutral self-care leave policies in a discriminatory way.”). 
 300. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1337 (rejecting a statutory provision aimed at self-care 
leave policies with a disparate impact on women, because those policies are not likely to be 
unconstitutional); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-86 (2000) (refusing to credit 
most instances of age discrimination because only irrational age discrimination violates the 
Constitution); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 641-46 (1999) (noting that a state deprives a patent holder of property when it 
infringes on a patent, but that deprivation only becomes a constitutional violation if 
effected without due process—i.e., without other state-level remedies). 
 301. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (striking down a statute in 
part because the “legislative record lacks examples of modern instances of” constitutional 
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amount of evidence of constitutional violations.302 Finally, the 
evidence must demonstrate that the targeted jurisdiction—not some 
other entity—is guilty of the violations.303 
 Notably, the Court has explicitly ignored evidence of 
constitutional violations committed by local governments.304 But the 
prophylactic enforcement legislation under review at the time (an 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity) did not apply to local 
governments (because they do not enjoy sovereign immunity in the 
first instance).305 Accordingly, “[i]t would make no sense to consider 
constitutional violations [by local governments], as well as by the 
States themselves.”306 In the context of Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation, however, it seems clear that the record of 
local governments is relevant, since they, too, would be subject to the 
legislation.307 
 That said, provided Congress develops a legislative record in 
accord with the aforementioned requirements, courts must defer to 
Congress’s determination.308 Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone out 
of its way to read the legislative record in a light most favorable to 
Congress, finding all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from 
the record to weigh in Congress’s favor.309 
                                                                                                                  
violations) (emphasis added); see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 
193, 203 (2009) (“[C]urrent burdens . . . must be justified by current needs.”). 
 302. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1336-37 (“The few fleeting references to how self-care 
leave is inseparable from family-care leave fall short of what is required . . . . These 
isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and testimony are stated as conclusions, 
unsupported by evidence or findings . . . .”) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369-370 (2001) (finding minimal 
evidence of unconstitutional disability-based discrimination by states); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 
89-90 (finding minimal evidence of unconstitutional age-based discrimination by states); 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 640-41 (finding almost no evidence of patent infringement by 
states); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31 (finding no evidence of religious discrimination by state 
and local governments); cf. Lane, 541 U.S. at 528 (upholding a statute “[g]iven the sheer 
volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional” conduct); 
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003) (upholding a statute because 
“the States’ record of unconstitutional” conduct is “weighty enough to justify” legislation). 
 303. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-72 (ignoring disability discrimination by local 
governments and private actors); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90-91 (ignoring age discrimination by 
the private sector). 
 304. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-69. 
 305. Cf. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
 306. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369. 
 307. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 527-28 n.16; cf. United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 
110, 117-35 (1978). 
 308. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531-32 (1997).  
 309. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 524-28 (crediting a wide variety of sources); Nev. Dep’t of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729-35 (2003) (making a series of inferences geared 
towards enhancing the strength of the legislative record); see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 528-29 
n.17 (noting the weak state of the legislative record in Hibbs, which nonetheless was still 
sufficient to uphold the statute at issue there). 
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 Specifically with regard to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation, the Court should be particularly deferential to the record 
if the evidence amassed by Congress shows that the restrictions run 
counter to the Sixty-Sixth Congress’s concerns about restrictions that 
are politically motivated, restrictions that burden women who take 
an active role outside the home, and restrictions that burden women 
on account of their childcare responsibilities.310 This is so even if 
those restrictions do not amount to intentional discrimination on 
account of sex. The Court has shown a willingness in congruence-
and-proportionality cases to enlarge pre-existing definitions of what 
constitutes a constitutional violation for purposes of determining 
whether a sufficient record of constitutional violations exists. In 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,311 for example, the 
Court for the first time “recognize[d] that laws regulating pregnant 
women can enforce unconstitutional sex stereotypes.”312 The 
expansion in Hibbs dovetails with the Sixty-Sixth Congress’s 
concerns about the certain types of voting restrictions discussed in 
Section IV.D. Therefore, the Court should have no trouble similarly 
taking an expansive view of what constitutes a Nineteenth 
Amendment violation for purposes of determining the sufficiency of a 
record of violations. 
 3.   The Appropriateness of the Remedy: Congruence and 
Proportionality 
 Finally, courts must look at the remedy to judge whether it is 
congruent and proportional to the constitutional violation Congress 
seeks to enforce.313 There is no set formula for whether a remedy is 
appropriately tailored to the particular wrong it targets; rather, the 
congruence-and-proportionality test is something of a sliding scale, 
allowing for more powerful remedies for greater harms while 
allowing only less powerful remedies for lesser harms.314 
 In analyzing a remedy for congruence and proportionality, courts 
will examine the scope of the legislation and the swath of state 
                                                                                                                  
 310. See supra Section IV.D (reviewing Congress’s concerns over these three items).  
 311. 538 U.S. 721, 728-37 (2003). 
 312. Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to 
Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1886 (2006) (“Hibbs is the first 
Supreme Court equal protection decision to recognize that laws regulating pregnant 
women can enforce unconstitutional sex stereotypes.”); see also id. at 1886-91 (discussing 
the expanded scope of what constitutes unconstitutional sex discrimination under Hibbs). 
 313. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (“There must be a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”). 
 314. See id. at 530 (“Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an 
unwarranted response to another, lesser one.”). 
564  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:507 
 
conduct it affects,315 as well as statutory limits316 on the legislation’s 
reach. In addition to examining the breadth of affected state conduct, 
courts will inquire into the depth of the law’s intrusion into  
state sovereignty.317 Beyond the sovereignty costs, courts will 
consider the practical cost in state resources necessary to shoulder 
the increased burden imposed by the remedy.318 Courts will also  
canvass alternative remedies to examine their availability and 
effectiveness.319 The final step is to weigh all these factors against  
the significance of the harm Congress seeks to remedy.320 
B.   Proposing Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Legislation 
 Congress should enact Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
legislation—a Nineteenth Amendment Voting Rights Act, or “VRA-
19”—to address each of the barriers to the ballot addressed in Part II 
of this Article. Whether or not such a VRA-19 would also include the 
“traditional” remedies of the Voting Rights Act of 1965—a private 
right of action, observers, examiners, preclearance, etc.—a VRA-19 
                                                                                                                  
 315. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738 (finding the statute to be “narrowly targeted”); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999) (“An 
unlimited range of state conduct would expose a state to [liability under the statute] . . . .”); 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (“Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of 
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and 
regardless of subject matter.”). 
 316. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531-32 (2004) (noting with approval 
substantive limits on a statute’s application); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738-40 (noting with 
approval substantive limits on both the statute’s reach and application); Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. at 646-47 (noting with disapproval that the statute applied to a wide range of 
cases with virtually no limits); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (surveying limits on the Voting 
Rights Act); cf. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86-88 (2000) (finding that the 
statute’s limits are too narrow to save it). 
 317. See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2001) (observing that the 
statute prohibits a significantly greater set of conduct than is actually unconstitutional); 
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-88 (same); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-34 (noting that the statute’s strict 
test would easily invalidate most challenged state action). 
 318. See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 646 (declaring that the statute will “subject[] 
States to this expansive liability”); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 (noting the statute will increase 
state litigation costs). 
 319. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (finding that the problem Congress sought to address 
“has persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy” it); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 
(noting that earlier, weaker legislation was ineffective); cf. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of 
Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1335 (2012) (“It follows that abrogating the States’ immunity from 
suits for damages for failure to give self-care leave is not a congruent and proportional 
remedy if the existing state leave policies would have sufficed.”); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
at 643-45 (observing that state court remedies were available even if federal court 
remedies were not). 
 320. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34 (upholding the statute as it applies to cases involving 
a fundamental right); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (“Strong measures appropriate to address 
one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.”). 
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with provisions specifically tailored to address particular types of 
voting restrictions would meet the demanding congruence-and-
proportionality test. 
 The first prong of the congruence-and-proportionality analysis—
that Congress must develop a record of unconstitutional 
discrimination in voting on the basis of sex—is sufficiently similar for 
each of the restrictions on the franchise discussed above that a single 
discussion covers the entire group. First, as illustrated in Part II, 
these obstacles to voting are becoming more and more widespread. 
The proliferation of these barriers is a recent phenomenon and 
illustrates that the obstacles to voting may amount to more than 
mere token instances of restrictions on voting. Second, the discussion 
in Part II illustrates that these restrictions may have a 
disproportionate impact on the basis of sex—usually against women, 
but in some cases against men; however, either is sufficient, given 
the gender-neutral application of the Nineteenth Amendment.321 
Third, states—not some other party—are generally the entities 
responsible for the restrictions322 and are therefore proper targets for 
enforcement legislation. 
 The more difficult question is whether these restrictions amount 
to voting discrimination on account of sex. They very well may. Part 
II already established that these restrictions may have a 
discriminatory impact on the basis of sex. The next relevant question 
becomes whether that impact is intentional. First, these restrictions 
are usually justified on the basis of preventing voter fraud.323 But 
there is little evidence that the type of fraud targeted occurs often 
enough to warrant the restrictions.324 Occasionally, advocates of these 
                                                                                                                  
 321. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (“The Ninteenth  
Amendment . . . applies to men and women alike . . . .”). 
 322. See Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 
553, 594 (2015) (“Many states, emboldened by the Court’s lax review of election 
regulations, have passed stringent, partisan-based election administration rules in recent 
years.”). 
 323. See, e.g., Pat McCrory, N.C. Governor: Protect Election Integrity, USA TODAY  
(Aug. 29, 2013, 12:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/28/voter-photo-
id-early-voting-north-carolina-gov-pat-mccrory/2724925.  
 324. See, e.g., Exhaustive Database of Voter Fraud Cases Turns up Scant Evidence That 
It Happens, NEWS21 (Aug. 12, 2012, 10:41 AM), http://votingrights.news21.com/article/ 
election-fraud-explainer; Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? 
Highlighting an Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
1, 7 (2009) (“There is little empirical or systemic evidence to support the contention that 
voter-initiated fraud is widespread, be it ineligible voters seeking to vote or eligible voters 
casting multiple ballots in several locations.”). 
 Although the rarity of voter fraud suggests that security and integrity concerns do not 
justify overly intrusive burdens on the right to vote, this does not mean that security and 
integrity are wholly unimportant. To the contrary, “improv[ing] the security and integrity 
of our elections” is “critically important,” especially “[a]s the country once again prepares to 
elect a president.” Hans A. von Spakovsky, Protecting the Integrity of the Election Process, 
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restrictions also justify their support as a cost-saving measure; 
however, it is not clear those justifications hold up to scrutiny 
either.325 For some, these less-than-compelling justifications may 
result from sincerely held but mistaken beliefs. For others, these 
ostensibly legitimate justifications, like fraud prevention or cost 
savings, may be a pretext for furthering partisan interests by 
imposing obstacles to the franchise that affect mostly one’s political 
opponents.326 Because women are more likely to register as members 
of and vote for the nominees of one party, political opponents of that 
party may be likely to intentionally target women with barriers to 
the ballot.327 While a more complete analysis is beyond the scope of 
this Article, Congress could easily use its power to conduct hearings, 
take testimony, and issue subpoenas, to determine the extent to 
which these restrictions are intentionally aimed at women, for 
political reasons or otherwise. 
 Even if Congress could not conclude that these restrictions 
constitute intentional discrimination, it could nonetheless find that 
these laws impact women’s scheduling flexibility—for instance, 
because women would be forced to spend time obtaining additional 
documentation or filling out additional paperwork (in the case of 
voter ID or proof-of-citizenship laws, or the elimination of same-day 
registration), or because women would have fewer opportunities to 
register or vote (in the case of early voting cutbacks and restrictions 
on third-party voter registration organizations). This impact, 
especially where the impact is severe, could force women to choose 
between their work or childcare obligations on one hand and their 
right to participate in democracy on the other. Viewed in light of the 
Sixty-Sixth Congress’s concerns about women’s active role outside 
the home and women’s ability to care for their children, Congress 
                                                                                                                  
11 ELECTION L.J. 90, 90 (2012); see also MYRNA PÉREZ, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
ELECTION INTEGRITY: A PRO-VOTER AGENDA 1 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/Election_Integrity.pdf (“The clamor [over voting restrictions] 
should not obscure a fundamental shared truth: Our elections should be secure and free of 
misconduct.”). 
 325. See, e.g., KASDAN, supra note 94, at 8 (discussing whether or not early voting 
increases or decreases costs). 
 326. See, e.g., Dara Kam & John Lantigua, Former Florida GOP Leaders Say Voter 
Suppression Was Reason They Pushed New Election Law, PALM BEACH POST  
(Nov. 25, 2012, 9:58 AM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-
politics/early-voting-curbs-called-power-play/nTFDy; Ned Resnikoff, Pennsylvania State 
Senator: Voter ID Law Is About ‘Suppressing Votes,’ MSNBC (Sept. 6, 2013, 7:02 AM), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/pennsylvania-state-senator-voter-id-law.  
 327. See, e.g., KELLY DITTMAR, RUTGERS CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN AND POL., THE GENDER 
GAP: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN VOTE CHOICE AND POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS (2014), 
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/closerlook_gender-gap-07-15-14.pdf.  
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could reasonably conclude that for purposes of building a record to 
justify enforcement legislation, these ostensibly gender-neutral 
burdens would constitute voting discrimination on account of sex. 
 However and wherever Congress builds a record, once it does so, 
the next question in a congruence and proportionality analysis is 
whether the provisions of the enforcement legislation it enacts—the 
remedies—are congruent and proportional to the right Congress 
seeks to protect. 
 1.   Voter ID Laws 
 Congressional legislation responding to voter ID laws might take 
one of several forms. A VRA-19 might prohibit these laws altogether. 
More likely, however, is that enforcement legislation would regulate 
voter ID laws in some way. Call these regulations “Title I” of the 
VRA-19. 
 To solve the name-matching problem, legislation should impose a 
non-materiality principle328 on state voter ID laws—that is, if the 
individual’s name on the ID and name in the voter registration rolls 
do not match, but the difference is not substantial, states must 
permit the individual to vote without any extra burdens.  
 To address the problem of differential rates of ID possession as 
well as the financial burdens to obtaining an ID, a VRA-19 should 
require states to provide the option of documenting voters’ identity at 
the polling place at the state’s expense, by having polling place 
officials photograph the voter and upload the photograph to a state 
database. Polling place officials could review this database in lieu of 
an ID in subsequent elections, using Internet-connected tablet 
computers. Known in election administration circles as “electronic 
poll books,” election officials in both Nevada and Minnesota have 
already proposed similar systems.329 
 These proposed VRA-19 voter ID provisions would be congruent 
and proportional to the violations Congress seeks to remedy. Title I 
would affect only a limited scope of state conduct—voter ID  
laws—and only to a limited extent. The proposals would impose 
minimal burdens on a state’s sovereignty—indeed, the electronic poll 
book proposal merely requires additional activity to accompany 
state’s voter ID rules. The proposals do not prohibit voter ID laws 
                                                                                                                  
 328. Cf. Justin Levitt, Resolving Election Error: The Dynamic Assessment of 
Materiality, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 104-18 (2012). 
 329. See Laura Myers, Nevada Secretary of State Grilled over Voter Verification 
Proposal, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 11, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/ 
news/crime-courts/nevada-secretary-state-grilled-over-voter-verification-proposal; Jim Ragsdale, 
DFLers Push for Photo ID Alternative, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2012, 9:43 PM), 
http://www.startribune.com/dflers-propose-photo-id-alternative/141952653.  
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altogether—laws that are normally within the state’s sovereign 
authority to enact (provided the voter ID laws do not violate some 
other provision of federal law, like the Fifteenth Amendment or the 
Voting Rights Act). The cost of the electronic poll book proposal can 
reach $10 to $20 million,330 but it pales in comparison to the overall 
cost of administering elections. States could also entirely avoid the 
costs of the electronic poll books by repealing their voter ID laws in 
the first place. Courts would be hard-pressed to find less intrusive 
measures that accomplish the same goal; indeed, Title I rejects the 
more intrusive measure of banning voter ID laws entirely. Voting 
rights advocates have tried other measures to block voter ID laws, 
but they have not had sustained success,331 bolstering the conclusion 
that Title I is acceptable. 
 Weighing all those relatively minimal intrusions against the 
incredible importance of the right to vote free from discrimination on 
account of sex, VRA-19’s Title I would pass the congruence-and-
proportionality test. 
 2.   Documentary-Proof-of-Citizenship Requirements 
 “Title II” of a VRA-19 might respond to documentary-proof-of-
citizenship laws by reversing the burden of proof of citizenship, 
creating a rebuttable presumption that the applicant who certifies 
his or her citizenship under oath is, in fact, a citizen. The state would 
have to accept a voter’s affirmation under oath of his or her 
citizenship, unless the state can bring forth contrary evidence of  
non-citizenship. 
 Alternatively (or in addition), Title II might permit a state to 
reject a voter registration application for lack of documentary proof of 
citizenship only if the state itself has thoroughly investigated the 
applicant’s citizenship and found that the applicant is not a United 
States citizen. Such a provision might also include a requirement 
that state voter registration forms include an option for the applicant 
to authorize the state to act as the applicant’s agent (and a 
corresponding requirement that other states and the federal 
government accept this delegation of authority) in procuring 
documentary proof of citizenship (like a birth certificate or certificate 
of naturalization). This would still allow states to insist on 
documentary proof of citizenship but would place on the state, not the 
voter, the burden of obtaining updated documents. 
 These remedies would be congruent and proportional to the 
violations. Title II would only affect a small swath of state  
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conduct—only documentary-proof-of-citizenship laws. With regard to 
the sovereignty intrusion, the Supreme Court has recently suggested 
that “it would raise serious constitutional doubts if a federal statute 
precluded a State from obtaining the information necessary to 
enforce its voter qualifications,”332 suggesting that the sovereignty 
intrusion of such a law might be significant. However, Title II would 
not prevent states “from obtaining the information necessary to 
enforce its voter qualifications”;333 rather, it would merely require 
that states go about obtaining that information in a different way, a 
significantly lesser intrusion on the state’s sovereignty. The actual 
cost of a system described in Title II—where the government must 
seek out proof of citizenship, not the applicant—is unclear, but inter-
governmental cooperation will lead to distributed costs and greater 
efficiency than if individual voters each had to track down these 
documents on their own. Additionally, states can avoid the cost 
entirely by merely accepting a voter’s sworn certification of United 
States citizenship. Title II is less intrusive than other possible 
remedies, like an outright ban on requiring documentary proof of 
citizenship. Even less intrusive remedies—like the National Voter 
Registration Act provision for a “federal form”334—are insufficient, 
because they reach only federal elections and because they are 
vulnerable to attack in the administrative realm.335 
 Balancing the importance of the right to vote free from 
discrimination on account of sex against the minimal intrusion at 
issue, Title II would withstand review under the congruence-and-
proportionality standard. 
 3.   Improper Voter Registration Database Maintenance Practices 
 “Title III” of a VRA-19 could address voter registration database 
management and list-matching practices by prohibiting states from 
taking adverse action against a voter or registration applicant solely 
on the basis of database list-matching, without some additional 
corroborating evidence. States might be able to fulfill this 
requirement by, for example, contacting the affected voter before 
taking any action or by obtaining corroborating information from 
another source. In the case of deceased voters, for instance, a state 
might learn that a voter had passed away from the Social Security 
Administration’s Death Index, and confirm the death in a newspaper 
obituary or by the non-response of the voter to a written inquiry. For 
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non-citizen voters, a state might discover a voter’s non-citizenship 
from a federal immigration database and confirm the non-citizenship 
status by checking the voter’s response to a jury selection form’s 
question about citizenship. 
 Like Titles I and II before it, Title III would constitute a congruent 
and proportional remedy as well. Voter registration database 
management procedures regulate only a small swath of state 
conduct. Additionally, Title III imposes only minimal burdens on a 
state’s sovereignty, because a state still controls its voter registration 
database; it merely has to comply with some additional requirements 
before taking action. Such a program would impose financial costs on 
states, but these costs are likely to constitute only a fraction of the 
overall cost of administering an election. Additionally, these costs are 
likely to decrease as inter-governmental cooperation allows states to 
better share data and eases the proposed corroboration requirement. 
Moreover, Title III’s procedural safeguards are less burdensome than 
requiring states to submit to a federally run voter registration 
system, and even less burdensome than a requirement that states 
follow North Dakota’s example336 and do away with voter registration 
entirely. Finally, the alternative remedies described in Part II that 
Congress has attempted under the National Voter Registration Act 
and the Help America Vote Act, have proven unworkable and have 
resulted in significant litigation.337 
 Compared to the minimal burdens that Title III imposes, the right 
to vote free from discrimination on account of sex is sufficiently 
weighty to justify the regulation of state voter registration database 
management practices. 
 4.   Cutbacks in Access: Early Voting, Election Day Registration, 
and Restrictions on Third-Party Voter Registration Groups 
 A hypothetical VRA-19 might include Titles IV through VI  
to address matters that increase the level of administrative hoops 
through which a voter must jump in order to cast a ballot: cutbacks 
in early voting and the revocation of Election Day registration.  
Title IV could set national standards requiring states to engage in a 
certain amount of early voting. Title V might require states to offer 
some variant of Election Day registration. Title VI could set national 
standards for third-party voter registration organizations so as to 
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preempt state restrictions. Each provision should contain an 
administrative procedure to allow states to request deviations from 
these national standards where the state shows a sufficient need. 
 By overruling state policy choices to the contrary, titles IV 
through VI would create the largest intrusions into state sovereignty 
of any of the VRA-19 proposals. Proposed Titles I to III, concerning 
voter ID, documentary-proof-of-citizenship, and voter registration 
database management, all allow states to continue their policy 
choices; they merely require the state to make some extra effort in 
order to maintain those procedures. Contrast those proposals with 
Titles IV through VI, which would outright overrule state policy 
choices, making the sovereignty intrusion more significant. This 
deeper intrusion into sovereignty, however, is still limited in  
scope—each proposal applies only to a narrow provision of election 
procedure. Additionally, the administrative “escape hatch” would 
decrease the burden on state sovereignty by allowing states to revert 
to their policy choices if they show a compelling justification. 
 Financial cost is only a potential issue with early voting, and even 
then, it’s not clear whether early voting might save more resources 
than it requires in expenditures.338 Election Day registration cannot 
increase costs—the cost to process a voter registration form is the 
same whether done on Election Day or prior to election. Any cost 
increase from more lenient, mandatory rules concerning third-party 
voter registration organizations—presumably attributable to the 
state having to process a greater number of voter registration 
applications because the third-party organizations are able to reach a 
greater number of potential voters—is likely to be minimal, given the 
small cost of processing each individual application. In fact, more 
lenient rules concerning third-party voter registration groups may 
save money, because states would no longer have to enforce more 
significant restrictions. 
 Other remedies, like litigation under the National Voter 
Registration Act, the Voting Rights Act, or constitutional provisions, 
as well as popular referenda, have had only mixed success stopping 
these specific cutbacks in convenience.339 Additionally, each provision 
affects only one portion of state election activity. 
 Although Titles IV through VI make for a closer call given their 
larger intrusion into state sovereignty, all other factors weigh in 
favor of Congress’s discretion to order these procedures. Especially 
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when balanced against the very weighty Nineteenth Amendment 
right at issue here, titles IV through VI all constitute congruent and 
proportional remedies. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The Voting Wars are ongoing. States have erected a host of 
barriers to the ballot, many of which burden women voters 
significantly more than men. Using the Nineteenth Amendment, 
however, Congress could help swing the momentum back towards the 
side of voting rights. In passing the Nineteenth Amendment, the 
Sixty-Sixth Congress (1) rejected decades of history in which voting 
rights failed to achieve constitutional respect and (2) gave Congress a 
significant, broad new power to enforce the voting rights of newly 
enfranchised women. Using that power, Congress has the authority 
to enact Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation that will 
tackle a host of barriers to the ballot, consistent with the Sixty-Sixth 
Congress’s stance that women, once enfranchised, not face lesser 
barriers that would keep them from exercising their right to vote in 
practice. 
 Congress not only has the authority to do so, but it must do so. 
States are getting more aggressive with their efforts to restrict the 
franchise. Some states are even attempting to avoid the reach of 
Congress’s traditional means of enforcing voting rights—the 
Elections Clause, which applies only to federal elections340—by 
creating federal and non-federal elections systems, so as to put many 
of their attacks on voting beyond the Elections Clause’s reach.341 
Other states may follow. Congress must act. 
 During the debate in the Sixty-Sixth Congress over the 
Nineteenth Amendment, Representative Israel M. Foster of Ohio 
said, “It is [a] kwoman’s right to be allowed to help select the officers 
and help make the laws under which she shall live as an American 
citizen. Our children and our children’s children will wonder with 
amazement why we so seriously debated this great act of simple 
justice.”342 Representative Foster was right: today, we are that 
generation, and we do “wonder with amazement why” the Nineteenth 
Amendment was so controversial. If Congress acts pursuant to its 
Nineteenth Amendment power to enforce the right to vote free from 
sex-based discrimination, succeeding generations may say the same 
about the proliferation of barriers to the ballot. 
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